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UNION FINES AND PICKET LINES:
THE NLRA AND UNION
DISCIPLINARY POWER
James B. Atleson*
I. PROLOGUE

Labor law watchers have become quite accustomed to observing
judicial tribunals employing interests in industrial stability, efficiency, economy, and industrial peace to justify a wide range of
limitations on employee freedom. The claims of dissenters such as
wildcat strikers and strikebreakers are often dismissed out of hand.
Frequently, less troublesome individual conduct receives only slightly
more consideration. Unfortunately, institutional concerns, admittedly
weighty, may be employed even in cases where the actual interest
in protecting the industrial system is minimal or doubtful.
The law seems to assume that the industrial system will run
efficiently only so long as individual disruptions do not interfere
with the relationship of union and employer. Thus, the NLRB and
the courts have made it difficult for an individual employee to
pursue his contractual claims through the grievance system or the
courts, and industrial or administrative concerns have led to rules
which prevent NLRB representation elections despite the wishes
of a majority of the employees.
Undoubtedly, individual interests are often strengthened when
courts recognize the institutional or group interests of the union,
since only the employer's interests were accorded significance in
earlier times. In cases where group or institutional interests conflict
with individual interests, however, the result may be to support the
interests of two bureaucracies, for the institutional interests of
union and employer often coincide. Such an occurrence is not always
a blessing for an individual employee. What's good for U.S. Steel
may be good for the United Steelworkers, but it may not be good
for dissenting steelworkers.
Judicial deference to institutional versus individual interests
parallels non-legal forces tending in the same direction. The centralization of decision-making power in international union headquarters,
* B.A. 1960, J.D. 1962, Ohio State University. LL.M. 1964, Stanford University..
Professor of Law, State University of New York at Buffalo.
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with the increased use of experts, causes a loss of local autonomy
and, in addition, reduces the effectiveness and likelihood of member
involvement. Moreover, the merger of AFL-CIO and the no-raiding
pact has removed another spur to development of local union vigor
although the impact of the Alliance for Labor Action has yet to be
determined.
This article traces one small area of conflict where employee
interests and union institutional concerns collide. Many other areas
of federal labor law involve the same conflict. The author does not
disagree with the consideration of institutional interests, nor with
the critical weight given these interests in many situations. What
is disturbing, however, is the assumption that the collective bargaining structure, the grievance system, the effectiveness of unions, will
come tumbling down if recognition is given to the protection of individual employee interests. Most disturbing of all is the judicial and
administrative tendency to automatically assume that stability and
industrial peace have no countervailing considerations.
II.

INTRODUCTION

One of the major aims of the Wagner Act of 19351 was to
protect industrial rights of individual employees. The concept of
"industrial democracy" included not only the negative right to be
free from arbitrary disruption, layoff or discharge, but also encompassed the affirmative, democratic concept of participation in a
lawmaking situation. Individual rights would be protected, however,
if at all, only by collective action such as organizing unions and
engaging in economic warfare through concerted activities. Moreover, the desire to protect collective action led to the restriction of
expressions of individual concerns which might interfere with effective concerted activity. Thus, a union representing a majority of the
employees in an appropriate bargaining unit under Section 9(a) of'
the Act will represent all of the employees in that unit, even those
who neither belong nor voted for that particular labor organization.
The majority union is deemed the "exclusive" representative of the
employees in the union, exclusiveness denoting that no other labor
union may represent these employees. 2 Similarly, it was early decided that individual contracts of employment may not modify
collective agreements, nor may previously drafted individual agree1 National Labor Relations Act of 1935, ch. 372, §§ 1-2, 49 Stat. 449 (1935), as
amended, 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-88 (1964).

2 See Plasti-Line, Inc. v. NLRB, 278 F.2d 482 (6th Cir. 1960).
8 Telegraphers v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 321 U.S. 342 (1944),
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ments excuse the obligation to collectively bargain under the Act.'
Thus, although individual interests were to be protected, concerted
activity was the chosen vehicle. It is only necessary to note at this
point that the vehicle chosen had an effect on the nature of permissible individual action and, thus, on the quality of protection afforded
individual interests. That is, concerted activity is only effective if
some limitation is placed on individual action which might interfere
with or thwart collective efforts. The medium, then, is at least part
of the message.
Individual interests have also been compromised in the name of
industrial stability, efficiency, or protecting the integrity of NLRB
elections. For instance, they are the normal justifications for rules
giving unions a reasonable period to bargain despite a clear change
of employee sentiment and for "contract bar" rules which maintain
contractual stability but may deny even the majority the right to
change their collective representative. Moreover, an established
union is protected from a iival's economic pressure as long as it is
certified (lawfully recognized) or where a valid election has been
held within the previous year.
The very existence of a union may affect the protection afforded
conduct otherwise protected by the Wagner Act. A critical right
granted by the Act was the right to take part in collective activity.
Although a union may waive its members' rights to strike during the
term of a collective agreement, the mere existence of the union may
restrict the scope of protected activity even in the absence of a
no-strike clause.5 Thus, employees who strike in "derogation" of
their representative's status, for instance, engage in unprotected
conduct." Strikes by minorities in aid of the union are protected,
4 J.I. Case Co. v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 332 (1944). "[T]he majority rules, and if it
colectivizes the employment bargain, individual advantages or favors will generally
in practice go in as a contribution to the collective result." Id. at 339.
5 Although unorganized employees may avail themselves of the protection
found in § 7, most of the cases have understandably arisen in the context of an established union. See NLRB v. Washington Aluminum Co., 370 U.S. 9 (1962).
6 See Plasti-Line, Inc. v. NLRB, 278 F.2d 482 (6th Cir. 1960); Harnischfeger
Corp. v. NLRB, 207 F.2d 575 (7th Cir. 1953). The NLRB and the Courts have
not always been in agreement on this problem. The NLRB found a walkout protected
where the strikers' aim was to demonstrate dissatisfaction with the progress of negotiation and to urge the employer to act promptly. Draper Corp., 52 N.L.R.B. 1477
(1943). The Fourth Circuit, however, held that the protection of wildcat strikers
would threaten the principles of collective bargaining and industrial peace. NLRB v.
Draper Corp., 145 F.2d 199, 202-203 (4th Cir. 1944). Thus, rather than look at the
precise aims of the strikers, the Court held that any unauthorized strike inherently
derogates the union's status. Compare the NLRB's decision in Sunbeam Lighting Co.,
136 N.L.R.B. 1248 (1962), with that of the Seventh Circuit, NLRB v. Sunbeam Lighting Co., 318 F.2d 661 (7th Cir. 1963).
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however, even though unauthorized. 7 The cases suggest that minorities lose the right to strike, as well as to bargain, when a majority
representative has been selected and designated and when their
concerted activity is neither authorized nor ratified by the union.'
Note that this approach insulates both the union as well as the
employer from minority action and, thus, supports the institutional
interests of both.
The fact of representation, then, drastically affects the right
of a minority to engage in concerted activities.' The Taft-Hartley
amendments of 1947 sought to widen the scope of freedom granted
to dissenting employees by giving employees the negative right to
refrain from any of the activities enumerated in Section 7 except
to the extent that such right might be affected by a valid union
security agreement.' 0 To protect the right to refrain from concerted
activity, Congress enacted Section 8(b) (1) (A) which makes it an
unfair labor practice:
[F]or a labor organization or its agents . . . to restrain or coerce
...employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in section 7:
Provided, that this paragraph shall not impair the right of a labor
organization to prescribe its own rules with respect to the acquisition
or retention of membership therein ....

11

Thus, the amendment created a right to refrain from concerted
activity and, presumably, a right to act in opposition to such activity.
Section 8 (b) (1) (A) protected against direct interference with this
7 See NLRB v. R.C. Can Co., 328 F.2d 974 (5th Cir. 1964); Western Contracting Corp. v. NLRB, 322 F.2d 893 (10th Cir. 1963).
8 See NLRB v. Sunbeam Lighting Co., 318 F.2d 661 (7th Cir. 1963). See also
NLRB v. Washington Aluminum Co., 370 U.S. 9, 14 (1962), where the Court held
protected a walkout in response to employment conditions and noted that the em-

ployees had no bargaining representative. See generally Gould, The Status of Unauthorized and "Wildcat" Strikes Under the NLRA, 52 CORNELL L.Q. 672 (1967).
Professor Gould has also considered the effect of racial discrimination on the law of
wildcat strikes. See Gould, Black Power in the Unions: The Impact Upon Collective
Bargaining Relationships, 79 YALE L.J. 46, 55-72 (1969).
9 Even before 1947, the right to engage in concerted activity was not absolute.
The most elementary form of collective activity, the strike for economic benefits,
can result in replacement of the striker. Since NLRB v. Mackay Radio & Tel. Co.,
304 U.S. 333 (1938), an employer may permanently replace economic strikers. This
doctrine was created by dictum and its justification is dubious. See Note, Replacement
of Workers During Strikes, 75 YALE L.J. 630 (1966).
Unfair labor practice strikers must be reinstated despite the hiring of replacements.
Even if they engage in unprotected conduct, reinstatement may be appropriate as a
remedy for the employer's unfair labor practice. See NLRB v. Thayer Co., 213 F.2d
748 (1st Cir. 1954). Although striking employees may be permanently replaced, they
are still engaging in protected conduct under § 7. Thus, employer discrimination, such
as the refusal to accept their unconditional offer to return to work, will violate

§ 8(a) (1).
10 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1964).

11 Id. § 158(b) (1) (A).
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right, and Section 8 (b) (2) insulated employment rights from union
affairs. 2 Thus, the pre-1947 bias in favor of concerted activity has
been modified in that individual employees have countervailing
rights protected by the statute.
The right to refrain from concerted action may encompass
affirmative action as well as negative refusals to act, for some concerted actions are themselves refusals to act, e.g., the strike. Although strikebreaking, like wildcat strikes, might seem to be conduct
in derogation of the union's status and, therefore, unprotected conduct, the Taft-Hartley amendment obviously seeks to protect some
kinds of disobedience. Wildcat strikes also involve disobedience to
union rules, but such strikes are not always in response to union
concerted action. Thus, even though the "right to refrain" includes
some affirmative conduct, the act at present creates a statutory bias
in favor of the strikebreaker and against the wildcatter. Such an
approach seems unduly narrow, however, as wildcat strikes often are
the result of a perceived lack of union action or a disagreement as to
timing of union action. As pointed out earlier, however, courts have
routinely condemned wildcat strikers without considering the implications of Section 7. Of course, employer discipline will normally
arise only in a wildcat situation for employers favor strikebreakers.
The problem will arise, however, in cases where union discipline is
meted out to dissenters, whether strikebreakers or wildcat strikers.
The judicial attitude toward wildcat strikers suggests that if such
conduct is unprotected in the sense that employer discrimination
will not contravene the Act, then union discipline will not violate
Section 8(b). It has been assumed, however, that Section 7 does
protect strikebreaking activity to some extent, thus creating the statutory bias favoring strikebreakers over wildcatters. The wildcatter,
of course, challenges the institutional interests of both the union and
the employer, perhaps explaining the differential treatment.
A trilogy of recent cases deals with the scope of union disciplinary power under Section 8 (b) (1) (A). On first glance, the Section
might be thought to be a mirror reflection of Section 8 (a) (1) which
protects against employer interference with Section 7 rights. Since
Section 8 (a) (1) is basically directed to interferences with organization, Section 8 (b) (1) would provide limitations on the use of union
power to induce employees to select or join a particular union.
Indeed, the use of force for these purposes is undoubtedly prohibited
12 Under § 8(b) (2) the union's powers to affect the employment status of an
employee is limited to compelling the payment of dues under a valid union security
clause. Employment status may not be affected as long as the employee tenders appropriate dues. Id. § 158(b) (2).
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under this Section,' 3 and Congress was primarily concerned with
threats of force or employment loss directed at securing membership.
The recent cases, however, have not involved union pressure to induce employees to join unions or to refrain from joining. They have,
ironically, dealt with established relationships and internal union
discipline.
The recent cases deal with employees who cross picket lines,
file unfair labor practice charges without exhausting intra-union procedures or exceed union-created production ceilings. Each type of
conduct threatens the union's strength or solidarity to some extent
but, ironically, each type of dissent draws support from the Section
7 right to refrain from participation in union activities or procedures.
Courts could be expected to tread lightly on territory thought sacred
by labor unions. Discipline is the union's most important device for
maintaining internal order and for enforcing membership obligations to the union in order to carry out its role in the collective
bargaining arena. Overzealous judicial interference could weaken
a union in its capacity of bargaining representative, a role for which
it has been delegated Congressional power. State courts had always
been aware that the cases reaching them focused on extremely
sensitive areas of internal affairs, and one would assume that federal
tribunals, operating under a statute not designed for internal union
review, would do likewise. Moreover, the protection of concerted
activities implies that there are limitations on employee freedom.
The conflict between group and individual interests cannot be
avoided, however, as both interests can draw support from Section 7.
Under the proviso to Section 8(b) (1) (A), some union discipline will be protected despite the fact that the discipline imposed
interferes with Section 7 rights. The scope of this proviso, however,
is not significantly clearer than the main provision itself. Although
the specific evils to which this section was directed were physical
violence and job discrimination, the questions involved in this article
will be the applicability of these provisions in situations not involving violence and job discrimination. This article will document the
gloomy prediction of Professor Cox after the provision's enactment:
Section 8(b)(1) may plunge the Board into a dismal swamp of
uncertainty. Its vagueness alone, not to mention the broad interpretations put upon it during the debates in Congress, encourages the filing of
great numbers of charges as weapons in fighting .

.

. unionization ....

A long period of uncertainty and heavy volume of litigation will be
necessary before the questions of interpretation can be resolved.' 4
13

The freedom of neutral employees from the threat of job loss by picketing

is protected by other provisions, §§ 8(b)(4) & 8(b)(7). Id. § 158(b)(4) & (b)(7).

14 Cox, Some Aspects of the Labor Management Relations Act, 1947, 61 HARv. L.
REv. 1, 33 (1947).
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Any investigation of union disciplinary power under the NLRA
must take account of the Labor Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959. The LMRDA 15 contains detailed provisions
relating to union elections, financial regulation and reporting, parentlocal relations, and, using a democratic analogy, protects individual
rights of union members in Title I. Under that title, members were
given the right of speech, assembly, political activity, and the freedom from discipline or discrimination for the exercise of these rights.
Union disciplinary power in relation to rights not enumerated
in Title I, however, was seemingly not affected. Thus, the effect of
the LMRDA on union discipline for exercising rights granted in
Section 7 of the NLRA is not clear. The LMRDA does recognize
union institutional interests, however, as provisos expressly permit
unions to limit specified rights by rules relating to a member's obligation to the union as an institution. The scope and effect of these
provisos must be considered in light of new developments under the
NLRA.' 6
The focus of this article, then, will be the substantive limits of
union disciplinary power under the NLRA and the problems of
accommodating the new scope of Section 8(b)(1)(A) to the
LMRDA.
III. A

PRELIMINARY LOOK AT SECTION

8 (b) (1) (A)

Before turning to the recent cases, a brief sketch of the scope
of Section 8(b) (1) (A) as interpreted by the NLRB and the courts
provides useful background data as well as interpretive insights.
The right to refrain from union activity means at a minimum
that employees are free to refuse to join a labor union.' 7 Congress
clearly intended to outlaw two means of achieving this end: (1) the
15 29 U.S.C. 401 (1964).
16 The avoidance of strikebreaking, for instance, would seem to be an elemental
obligation owed to the union, and thus, discipline for such conduct would not violate
§ 101(a)(2) of the LMRDA. Although the Supreme Court has reached a similar
result under § 8(b) (1) (A) of the LM2RDA, the Court implied that the latter section
provided limits to the union's disciplinary power. See NLRB v. Allis-Chalmers, 388
U.S. 175 (1967).
17 Organizational picketing, aimed at inducing non-members to join a particular
labor organization was proscribed in 1959 by § 8(b) (7). Not all such pressure is
proscribed, however. A union may satisfy § 8(b) (7) (C) by filing a representation
petition under section 9 and maintain its picket line at least until the election is held.
See Local 840, Hod Carriers, 135 N.L.R.B. 1153 (1962). Furthermore, a proviso protects informational picketing even though "an object" of organization or recognition
is present. See Hotel & Restaurant Employees Union, 135 N.L.R.B. 1183 (1962). Such
permissible inducement does cut into the § 7 right "to refrain," but given the
specificity of § 8(b) (7), could not be a violation of § 8(b) (1) (A). In any event, such
picketing would not constitute "restraint or coercion" within § 8(b) (1) (A).
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threat or use of force and (2) the threat of employment loss. The
right to refrain, however, extends to all of the rights granted by
Section 7. Thus, since Section 7 grants the right to engage in concerted activity, the 1947 amendment suggests initially that employees may refuse picket line duty and are also free to cross picket
lines.
Although the provision may have been drafted primarily to
protect non-members from threats of force and violence, the Board
has always treated the provision as applying to union members as
well as non-members"8 and as extending beyond organizational campaigns. Thus, assaults and threats of violence committed by a union
constitute an unfair labor practice when the activity has a reasonable tendency to restrain employees in the exercise of their right to
cross a picket line.1 9 The conduct prescribed, therefore, is not only
violence directed to employees in order to get them to join the labor
organization, but violence directed to get them to take part in protected activity. Unfortunately the violent nature of the prescribed
conduct has often obfuscated the nature and scope of the activity
being protected.
Further assistance in discovering the scope of Section 8(b)
(1) (A) stems from its relation to the anti-discrimination provisions
of Section 8. Sections 8(a)(3) and 8(b)(2) are directed toward
insulating an employee's job rights from his organizational status,
and violations of Section 8(b)(2) are also violations of Section
8 (b) (1) (A).2° Thus, these sections protect against job interference
designed to encourage obedience to union rules.21 The union is prohibited not only from threatening discharge but from interfering
with seniority rights and other wage connected benefits as well.22
The only exception is that under a valid union shop contract the
union may cause the firing of one of its members who refuses to
18 See, e.g., Sugar Workers Local 9, 146 N.L.R.B. 154 (1964); Painters Local 6,
97 N.L.R.B. 654 (1951), enforced, 202 F.2d 957 (6th Cir. 1953), cert. denied, 345 U.S.
995 (1953). Even coercive action directed against non-striking employees was found
to be an unfair labor practice where it demonstrated to cooperative strikers the
consequences of a decision to abandon the strike. Woodworkers Local 426, 116 N.L.R.B.
507 (1956), enforced, 243 F.2d 745 (5th Cir. 1957).
19 See Progressive Mine Workers Union v. NLRB, 187 F.2d 298 (7th Cir. 1951);
Steel Workers Local 2118, 153 N.L.R.B. 1561 (1956).
20 Violations of § 8(b)(2) involving unlawful union security arrangements are
also violations of § 8(b) (1) (A). See, e.g., NLRB v. Local 269, IBEW, 357 F.2d 51 (3rd
Cir. 1966); NLRB v. Filtron Co., 309 F.2d 184 (2d Cir. 1962).
21 NLRB v. A. & B. Zinman, Inc., 372 F.2d 444 (2d Cir. 1967); NLRB v. UAW,
Local 899, 297 F.2d 272 (1st Cir. 1961) ; Teamsters Local 85, 175 N.L.R.B. No. 112,
71 L.R.R.M. 1248 (1969); Majestic Molded Products, Inc., 143 N.L.R.B. 71 (1963),
enforced, 330 F.2d 603 (2d Cir. 1964).
22 See, e.g., Local 479, Clothing Workers, 151 N.L.R.B. 555 (1965).
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pay dues or initiation fees. Causing employees to be fired for any
other reason is a violation of Section 8(b) (2) and is usually held
to be a violation of Section 8(b) (1) (A) as well.
This "job discrimination" aspect of Section 8 (b) (1) (A) demonstrates that the Section applies to members as well as non-members
and covers some aspects of internal union relations. Thus, an attempt
to collect intra-union fines by threatening to cause an employer to
fire an employee is an unfair labor practice.2 3 Nor can the union
cause a member to be in arrears on dues payments by applying
dues to the payment of fines.24 Similarly, unions and employers may
25
not use the threat of job loss to collect strike assessments.
Additional support for the coverage of union members under
Section 8(b)(1)(A) is found in the NLRB's fair representation
cases. The obligation of a union to fairly represent all the members
of the bargaining unit has been enforced under Section 8 (b) (1) (A),
and protection has been accorded members as well as non-members. 26
The protection stems not from Section 9, the foundation of the
judicial development of the doctrine, but from implicit guarantees
in the affirmative rights granted in Section 7. Obviously, this development is inconsistent with an argument that the section is limited to
organizational efforts.
Although Section 8 (b) (1) (A) extends to union members as well
as non-members, the proviso would seem crucial to the scope of protection members will receive. The proviso does not protect all intraunion activity; violence directed at union members might be enforced
within the union-member relationship, yet it is not protected by
the proviso. Until recently, however, it seemed clear that the proviso
would protect expulsion from scrutiny. Recent cases, however, suggest that even this reading of the proviso might be limited in certain
cases. The Board, for instance, has held that enforcement of union
23 Local 450, IUOE, 122 N.L.R.B. 564 (1958), enforced, 281 F.2d 313 (5th Cir.
1960), cert. denied, 366 U.S. 909 (1961). See also Local No. 479, Clothing Workers, 151
N.L.R.B. 555 (1965); Peerless Tool & Engr. Co., 111 N.L.R.B. 853 (1955).
24 See Bay Counties District Council of Carpenters, 145 N.L.R.B. 1775 (1964).
25 Brooks, 131 N.L.R.B. 756 (1961). Job rights are protected even though federal
involvement may cause serious internal friction. Thus, in a recent case, a union was
held to have violated §§ 8(b)(2) and 8(b)(1) (A) when it caused employers to
fire and refuse to hire an employee who had been expelled for failure to pay a union
fine. The employee had been fined $1000 for striking a union business agent during an
argument over contributions to the pension fund, and employees on construction sites
refused to work with the employee. Bricklayers Local 11, 162 N.L.R.B. 668 (1967),
enforced, 67 L.R.R.M. 2720 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 69 L.R.R.M. 2434 (1968).
26 See United Rubber Workers Local 12 v. NLRB, 368 F.2d 12 (5th Cir. 1966);
Miranda Fuel Co., 140 N.L.R.B. 181 (1962), enforcement denied on other grounds, 326
F.2d 172 (2d Cir. 1963). See generally Sovern, The National Labor Relations Act and
Racial Discrimination, 62 CoLuM. L. REV. 563 (1962).
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rules, even by expulsion, is proper so long as the effect does not
radiate beyond the union-member relationship and enter the employer-employee relationship.2 7 The line is unclear, however. Moreover, this formulation cannot explain cases dealing with violence,
for violence would have to be treated as a means of enforcement
which falls outside of the union-member relationship to explain its
prohibition under Section 8 (b) (1) (A).
The NLRB's approach has traditionally stressed the means by
which the union sought to achieve conformity with its goal, and it
has employed the proviso generally to protect internal union discipline. When an employee becomes a union member, the union
acquires means of enforcing its discipline other than the clearly
prohibited means of force or job discrimination. The NLRB generally protected these internal enforcement processes, despite the
fact that union discipline often has an impact beyond the unionmember relationship. The Board's attempt to avoid scrutinizing the
substantive validity of union rules and union discipline where Section 7 rights were involved, however noble, was doomed to failure.
Indeed, the breach in the wall was made initially by the Board
itself. The NLRB in Skuras8 overruled previous administrative
rulings29 and held that the imposition of fines for filing an unfair
labor practice was itself an unfair labor practice.
The Board, however, has not taken the same approach where
employees have been disciplined for filing decertification petition under Section 9(c) (1) (A) (ii) of the NLRA.3 ° The right to challenge
a particular representative would seem to be one method of preserving the employee's right to designate a representative of his own
choosing for collective bargaining. In a case involving violence or job
discrimination, the Section 7 right to be active in urging decertification is not waived by membership in the union under the proviso to
Section 8 (b) (1) (A) . Yet, in Tawas Tube, the NLRB permitted
expulsion for the filing of a decertification petition.3 2 The critical
27 See Local 248, UAW, 149 N.L.R.B. 67 (1964). The Board took a similar approach in Local 283, UAW, 145 N.L.R.B. 1097 (1964), where the union imposed the
fine upon a member who had exceeded a union imposed production quota in a shop
where employees were compensated on a piece-rate bonus basis.
28 Local 138, IUOE, 148 N.L.R.B. 679 (1964).
29 Thus, the General Counsel had ruled that a member could be suspended for
filing an unfair labor practice charge. Adm. Ruling of NLRB Gen. Counsel, Case
No. 1059, 35 L.R.R.M. 1167 (November 19, 1954).
30 29 U.S.C. § 159(c) (1) (A) (ii) (1964).
81 See Aristocrat Inns of America, Inc., 146 N.L.R.B. 1599 (1964); Painters

District Council, No. 6, 97 N.L.R.B. 654 (1951), enforced, 202 F.2d 957 (6th Cir.
1953) cert. denied, 345 U.S. 995 (1953).
82

Tawas Tube Products, Inc., 151 N.L.R.B. 46 (1965).
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distinction was that the member in Tawas had appealed to the Board
for the purpose of attacking the very existence of the union under
Section 9 rather than seeking to compel the union to abide by Section
8 of the Act. The Board said that Skura was not based upon a general Section 7 right to invoke Board processes, but upon a much
narrower right-the right to invoke its processes for the sole purpose
of compelling the union to abide by the Act. It seems clear, however,
that the Board was differentiating among Section 7 rights, and it
could not have rested its decision on a distinction between Section 7
and non-Section 7 rights.-3
Another problem in interpreting Section 8(b)(1)(A) is the
scope of "restraint." Thus, one question raised in the recent AllisChalmers decision was whether fines enforced by judicial process
constituted "restraint" under Section 8(b) (1) (A). Fines could certainly fall within the meaning of "restrain or coerce" without overly
straining the language, especially since the Section has not been
limited to activity which has the physical characteristics of coercion.
Fines punishable only by expulsion, however, would seemingly be
protected by the proviso, for coercion would stem not from the
imposition of the fine, but, rather, from the ultimate sanction of
expulsion which is permitted by the proviso. Thus, some fines would
seem to be protected by the proviso. 4 Subsequent discussion, however, will demonstrate the problems involved in such logical assumptions.
This brief discussion of the development of Section 8 (b) (1) (A)
sets the stage for a series of Supreme Court cases which forced the
Court to face directly the implicit conflict in Section 7 between the
protection of concerted activity and the protection of individual
acts of resistance to concerted activity. The decisions are illuminating although less than satisfying.
IV.

UNION FINES AND PICKET LINES: ALLIS-CHALMERS

One of the most important and most controversial cases in-

volving the scope of Section 8(b) (1) (A) is NLRB v. Allis-Chalmers.85 The question was precisely put by Mr. Justice Brennan:
83 The fact that Skura involved a fine and Tawas involved expulsion would not
seem critical. This distinction would make sense only if expulsion did not operate to
deter employees in the exercise of their section 7 rights. Although expulsion is expressly permitted in the proviso, the Board did not use the proviso in striking down
the fine in Skura and this decision was clearly based on policy grounds.
34 See Comment, 8(b) (1) (a) Limitations Upon the Right of a Union to Fine Its
Members, 115 U. PA. L. REv. 47 (1966).

85 388 U.S. 175 (1967).
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[W]hether a union which threatened and imposed fines, and
brought suit for their collection, against members who crossed the
union's picket line and went to work during an authorized strike against
their employer, committed the unfair labor practice under § 8(b) (1) (A)
of the National Labor Relations Act of engaging in conduct "to restrain or coerce" employees in the exercise of their right guaranteed by
§ 7 to "refrain from" concerted activities. 36

Lawful strikes were conducted at Allis-Chalmers' plants at
West Allis and LaCrosse, Wisconsin, in support of new contract
demands. In compliance with the United Auto Workers' Constitution the strikes were called with the approval of the International
Union after at least two-thirds of the members of each local voted
by secret ballot to strike. Perhaps because of historically strife-torn
relations at these plants, some members of each local crossed the
picket line and worked during the strikes. At the end of the' strike,
the locals brought proceedings against these union members charging
them with violation of the international constitution and by-laws.
These charges were heard by local trial committees in proceedings
at which the charged members were represented by counsel. Each
charged member was found guilty of "conduct unbecoming a Union
Member" and was fined a sum varying between $20 and $100.
Some of the fined members refused to pay the fine, and one of the
locals obtained a judgment in the amount of the fine against one of
its members in the Milwaukee County Court.3 7 Notwithstanding the
imposition of the fines, neither the employment status nor the membership status of the fined members was disturbed.
Unfair labor practice charges were filed by Allis-Chalmers on
behalf of the fined employees. A complaint was issued but, after
hearing, the trial examiner recommended its dismissal. The examiner
was sustained by the NLRB on the ground that even if the action
was "restraint or coercion," the conduct was protected by the proviso
to Section 8(b) (1) (A) which provides that the Section "shall not
impair the right of a labor organization to prescribe its own rules
with respect to the acquisition or retention of membership therein."
The NLRB did not focus upon the precise means of enforcement,
judicial process, an issue which was to divide both appellate courts.
Nor did the NLRB question the propriety of Allis-Chalmers' action
as representative of the strikebreakers.
36 Id. at 176.
At the time of the Supreme Court decision, an appeal in the County Court
was
still pending before the Wisconsin Supreme Court. Id. at 177. Dissenting employees
had also crossed picket lines in 1959. During a 54-day strike, 175 out of 7400 bargaining unit employees disregarded the strike and went to work. Each was fined in
an
amount not exceeding $100. Local 248, UAW, 149 N.L.R.B. 67 (1964).
37
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A majority of the Board held that the case was governed by
8
In this case, union fines
NLRB v. Wisconsin Motor Corporation.1
against members who had exceeded union-determined production
ceilings were held protected by the proviso. The Board had attempted to develop a distinction between discipline which treated
members as members and discipline which treated members as employees. Thus, the production-ceiling was protected because "the
union deliberately restricted the enforcement of its rule to an area
involving the status of a member rather than as an employee .... "
The Board felt that similar treatment must be given to the complaint
in Allis-Chalmers since the union had imposed the fine only on their
members and no attempt was ever made to affect the jobs or working
conditions of the strikebreaking employees. This analysis is not
particularly helpful since the union probably could not have imposed
fines on non-members, and Section 8 (b) (2) would apply if employment was affected by the union's action. The key holding was that
a rule prohibiting members from crossing a picket line during a
strike was a legitimate union concern and, therefore, could properly
be the subject matter of internal discipline. Typically, however, the
NLRB has stressed the means of union discipline and has attempted
to obfuscate its review of the substantive validity of the union rule
involved. As we shall see, this confusion as to the doctrinal basis
of the NLRB's approach was to be reflected in the Supreme Court's
decision.
The Board was forced to distinguish cases in which violations
were found when fines were imposed on union members who filed
unfair labor practice charges with the Board without exhausting
internal union remedies." 9 In these cases, the Board pointed out,
the rules involved went "beyond the competence of the union to
enforce since they interfered with the right of union members to
seek redress with the Board through the filing of charges." The rule
involved in Allis-Chalmers, however, involved the loyalty of its
members during a time of crisis for the union. The Act does not
deprive a union of all recourse against those of its own members
who undermine a strike in which it is engaged. When the strike is
lawful and the picket line is lawful, a union is not prohibited from
taking steps to preserve its own integrity.
The Board admitted that virtually all union rules have some
effect on a member's employment relationship. The question, said
88

145 N.L.R.B. 1097 (1964).

89 See Local 138, IUOE, 148 N.L.R.B. 679 (1964); Local No. 925, IUOE, 148

N.L.R.B. 674 (1964).
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the Board, is whether in enforcing the rule the union goes outside
the area of union-member relationship and enters the area of employer-employee relationship.
The original opinion of the Seventh Circuit denied the company's petition for review; en banc, however, the NLRB was reversed.40 The opinion on re-hearing begins its retreat with the
astounding statement that "the statutes in question present no
ambiguities whatsoever, and therefore do not require recourse to
legislative history for clarification. The wording used evolved out
of extensive Congressional debate and study. Although in our original opinion we rejected a literal reading of the statutes, in effect,
we conceded that such a literal reading would require reversal of
the Board's Order.'
The court in its original opinion had relied on statements in
Curtis Brothers that Congress was concerned with the elimination of
"repressive tactics bordering on violence or involving particularized
threats of economic reprisal .... The court now held that it had
been incorrect in determining that "economic reprisal" referred
only to things such as securing discharge or reducing pay. The
new majority felt that since the act protected a member from
union threats to take away his wages by securing his discharge,
it also protected him from threats to take away his wages by the
imposition of fines. "A substantial fine such as permitted here may
easily pose a greater threat to a member than simple expulsion from
the union."43
The appellate court stressed the potentially expensive cost of
crossing picket lines. One hundred dollars was the maximum fine
permissible under the union constitution and since crossing of the
picket lines could be treated as a separate offense, the fines could
have been considerably greater than those actually imposed. The
majority was concerned because consecutive fines could run into
thousands of dollars and create a far greater burden on employees
than expulsion from his union or loss of a job.
A key statement of the court was that membership in this case
was not the result of individual voluntary choice but of the insertion
of a union security provision in the contract under which a substantial minority of the employees may have been forced into mem40 358 F.2d 656 (7th Cir. 1966).
41 Id. at 660.
42 NLRB v. Teamsters Local 639, 362 U.S. 274, 287 (1960).
43 358 F.2d at 660.
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bership. The court, however, referred to no evidence that the
membership of the employees in question was indeed involuntary.
The Supreme Court upheld the Board, but the opinion raises
as many questions as it answers." Although five justices voted to
permit the union's fines, Mr. Justice White wrote a concurring
opinion which states his doubts about the implications of the opinion written by Mr. Justice Brennan. Mr. Justice Black, joined
by three colleagues, wrote a strong dissent. The numeral majority
therefore, does not represent a clear pronouncement on the issues presented. Given the nature of the issues raised, however, and the range
of views on the NLRB and Seventh Circuit, hopes for forthright
pronouncements could have been premature. In two subsequent
cases, the Court has had the opportunity to clarify and modify the
meaning of Allis-Chalmers.
Mr. Justice Brennan's opinion can be divided into three parts.
First, he discussed the impact that a literal reading of Section
8 (b) (1) (A) would have upon union effectiveness. Finding that such
a reading would lead to drastic results, he then considered whether
the legislative history supported a literal reading. Since he placed
a great burden on Congressional history to demonstrate the provision's application to strikebreaking fines, the outcome was never
in doubt. Finally, the opinion stressed that "full members" of labor
unions bind themselves to disciplinary measures in the union's constitution and by-laws. None of the Court's findings are free from
doubt, and each must be scrutinized separately.
As expected, Justice Brennan admonished the Seventh Circuit
for applying the "clear meaning rule" to Section 8(b) (1) (A).
"[E]ven if the inherent imprecision of the words 'restrain or coerce'
may be overlooked, recourse to legislative history to determine the
sense in which Congress used the words is not foreclosed." 45 Indeed,
the Court itself had earlier warned about loose reading of Section
8(b) (1) (A)." The Court's polite rejection of the "clear meaning"
rule did not immediately lead the Court into an investigation of the
legislative history, however. Rather, the Court discussed the various
policy grounds which suggested that Congress could not have in44 388 U.S. 175 (1967).

45 Id. at 179. The Court referred to National Woodwork Mfg. Ass'n v. NLRB,
386 U.S. 612 (1967), as a case in which conduct may have been unambiguously embraced within the literal language but was excluded by the Court's reading of legislative history. See also NLRB v. Fruit & Vegetable Packers & Warehousemen Local 760,
377 U.S. 58 (1964).
46 See NLRB v. Teamsters Local 639, 362 U.S. 274 (1960).
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tended a literal reading. The Court stressed that effective collective
action was envisioned by Congress:
National labor policy has been built on the premise that by pooling their economic strength and acting through a labor organization
freely chosen by the majority, the employees of an appropriate unit
have the most effective means of bargaining for improvement in wages,
hours, and working conditions. 47
Since concerted activity is crucial, unions must have the power
to enforce rules designed to implement its role. The collective bargaining representative has power "comparable to those possessed by
a legislative body both to create and restrict the rights of those
whom it represents ... .,4" And this legislative power could validly
be used to preserve the unity necessary to carry out congressional
objectives. The union's power to protect itself against erosion is
particularly vital when it engages in strikes for "[t]he economic
strike against the employer is the ultimate weapon in labor's
arsenal for achieving agreement upon its terms. .. "'I and "the power
to fine or expel strike-breakers is essential if the union is to be an
effective bargaining agent .

. . ."

Professor Summers has stated

that "[s]trike-breaking is uniformly considered a sufficient reason
for expulsion whether or not there is an express prohibition, for it
undercuts the union's principal weapon and defeats the economic
objective for which the union exists."'"

Provisions in union constitutions and by-laws for fines and
expulsion of strikebreaking are common.52 The union's raison d'&re
is its ability to act as an effective economic force to gain benefits
for its members. Any act which weakens the solidarity of the membership is treated as a threat to its existence. Solidarity is essential
during a strike, and, accordingly, strikebreaking is seen as treason
for it furnishes the opposition with labor, "the weapon with which
the battle is fought."5 3
Provisions for court enforcement, however, are no doubt rare.
In a footnote, the Court attempts to skirt this fact by stating that
the "potentiality of resort to courts for enforcement is implicit in
U.S. at 180 (1967).
Steel v. Louisville & N.R.R., 323 U.S. 192, 202 (1944).
49 388 U.S. at 181.
50 Summers, Legal Limitations on Union Discipline, 64 HARv. L.
REV. 1049
(1951).
51 Summers, Disciplinary Powers of Unions, 3 IND. & LAB. REL. REV.
483, 495
(1950).
52 See id. at 508-12; U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR,
BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, DIsCIPLINARY POWERS AND PROCEDURES IN UNION CONSTITUTIONS
(Bull. No. 1350, 1963).
53 Summers, Disciplinary Powers of Unions, 3 IND.
& LAB. REL . REV. 483, 488-89
47 388
48

(1950).

19701

UNION FINES AND PICKET LINES

any binding obligation." The Court cites an 1867 case to show that
54
judicial enforcement of fines is not "a rather recent innovation."
Despite the Court's valiant attempt, however, court enforcement of
55
union fines is extremely rare.
The Court's approach ignores the long-standing antagonism
between unions and the courts. It is difficult to believe that courtenforcement of fines was within the reasonable expectation of the
union, let alone the members. Union by-laws contain many provisions aimed at avoiding public notice of intra-union problems. Thus,
disclosing union business outside the union hall is a common offense.
Even more relevant here is the common provision which penalizes
the resort to judicial administrative bodies until intra-union appeals
procedures have been exhausted. An obvious factor militating
against judicial enforcement is that the action broadcasts the union's
inability to internally control its members and induce compliance
with its rules.
The rarity of court enforcement of fines suggests that this
disciplinary device is inconsistent with the expectations of employees.
The Court, however, finding that judicial enforcement is implicit in
any binding obligation, suggests that state courts should enforce
such fines. The basis for such enforcement is the traditional view
that the provisions of a union's constitution and by-laws constitute
a "contract" between the members and the union which could be
judicially enforced.56
The contract notion was used by state courts to provide a
vehicle to protect individual rights without appearing to create external standards.57 Thus, the "contract," as read by the courts,
provided the appropriate standards, and the court merely enforced
union obedience to their privately established standards. The approach, then, is a legacy of judicial reluctance to interfere with
private associations. Professor Summers has shown, however, that
this approach permitted courts to exercise great power to interpret
union constitutions and by-laws in attempting to protect democratic
rights, and the vagueness of many provisions provided judicial
58
opportunity for reading in public policy standards. Even when
54 388 U.S. at 182 n.9.
55

See Christensen, Union Discipline Under Federal Law: Institutional Dilemmas

in an Industrial Democracy, 43 N.Y.U. L. REv. 227, 270 (1968).
56 See Summers, The Law of Union Discipline: What the Courts Do in Fact, 70
YALE

L.J. 175, 180 (1960).

Legal Limitations on Union Discipline, 64 HARV. L. REV. 1049, 1055
(1951).
58 A question subsequently to be discussed is the extent to which the Court's pronouncements will affect state court actions. One way in which state courts provided
57 Summers,
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discipline was based upon a charge specifically set forth in the
union's laws, and the court agreed with the union's interpretation,
courts sometimes used public policy to invalidate obnoxious clauses.
And that, in a sense, is the question in Allis-Chalmers--does the
union's exercise of power, court enforcement of fines, interfere with
federal public policy as expressed in Section 8 (b) (1) (A)? Although
Congress did not want to interfere with internal union discipline in
1947, the legislative history supports only the view that Congress
did not want to interfere too much-how much was never made clear.
Since this Section was clearly aimed at union members as well as nonunion members, Section 8(b) (1) (A) must have some impact on
union discipline.
The Court stressed that Congress could not have meant to limit
unions in the powers necessary to the discharge of their role as
exclusive bargaining agents by impairing the usefulness of labor's
cherished strike weapon. 9 The Court stated that where a union
is strong and membership is valuable, expulsion, permissible under
the proviso, would create a far more severe penalty upon the member
than a reasonable fine. It follows that Congress could not have
intended to bar a lesser penalty. On the other hand, where the union
is weak and membership therefore of little value, the Court feared
that the union faced with further depletion of its ranks may have no
real choice except to condone the members' disobedience. "Yet, it is
just such weak unions for which the power to execute union decisions taken for the benefit of all employees is most critical to effective discharge of its statutory function."6
Although the Court is undoubtedly concerned that unions be
able to protect themselves in strike situations, the strike weapon
has been limited in other situations, especially when faced with the
competing interest in the employer's maintenance of operations.
Thus, an employer may hire permanent replacements during a lawful
economic strike and, furthermore, current lockout doctrine permits
anticipatory and defensive lockouts which substantially diminish the
right to strike. 1 The interests of the strikebreaker, however, were
neither weighed nor considered by the Court despite Section 7.
substantive protection to members was to insist that the union's power to act in a
particular fashion be granted in the constitution and by-laws. At present, I assume,
few constitutions provide for court enforcement, although this may change. The Court,
however, stressed that this power was "implicit" in any enforcement scheme.
59 388 U.S. at 183.
60 Id. at 184.
61 See generally Meltzer, The Lockout Cases, 1965 SuP. CT. REV. 87; Oberer,
Lockouts and the Law: The Impact of American Ship Building and Brown Food, 51
CORNELL L.Q. 193 (1966).
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Moreover, the Court's assumptions about the situation in strong
and weak unions are not fully convincing. Where a union is strong
and membership is valuable, for instance, strikebreaking might not
be a realistic threat to organizational stability, and expulsion may
even be a threat when a labor union is weak. The Court's reference
to the "strength" of a union is unclear for strength could be measured in a number of ways. If the threat of expulsion is sufficient
to induce compliance with union policies, the reasons may not relate
to the bargaining effectiveness of the union, the most common referent for estimating the strength of unions. Employee compliance
could be induced because the employee places a high value on the
right to participate in union affairs, because the union provides substantial health or welfare benefits, or because of the social costs of
exclusion. The relative costs of the threat of expulsion vis-h-vis the
threat of judicial enforcement of a fine involves a host of variables,
among them being the amount of the fine, the individual's personal
attachment to the union, and the credibility of the threat.
In a particular case expulsion may be more severe than a fine
because of the loss of union benefits such as group insurance and
pensions. Indeed, loss of membership is serious for another reason
often ignored by courts. Expulsion means that the right of participation would be lost, a right to participate in the political process which
results in work place legislation. Union government is a political
process, and membership is required to vote and speak out on
critical issues, officer elections, and bargaining matters. Furthermore,
membership is critical because of the union's important role in day
to day administration of the agreement as well as the union's control of the grievance system. Although participatory rights have been
recognized in the LMRDA, the act provides no remedies for employees who62are excluded from membership for it applies only
to members.
Whether or not fines are more severe than expulsion, the need
of unions, especially weak ones, for the power to judicially enforce
fines is far from clear. Justice Black, in dissent, felt that "the real
reason for the Court's decision is its policy judgment that unions,
especially weak ones, need the power to impose fines on strike63
breakers and to enforce those fines in court." This assertion is not
without foundation, although the majority was concerned about the
union's power to maintain discipline during the strike, feeling that

62

See Hughes v. Iron Workers, Local 11, 287 F.2d 810 (3d Cir. 1961), cert.

denied, 368 U.S. 829 (1961). Cf. Moynahan v. Pari-Mutuel Employees Local 280, 317

F.2d 209 (9th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 911 (1963).
63 388 U.S. at 201.
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the right to strike was critically important in order that the union
might carry out the role that Congress had envisioned for it. Where
a union is weak, however, it is questionable whether the imposition
of fines will instill a high sense of solidarity and discipline. Although
the Wagner Act looked to the formation of strong unions, it is
doubtful that discipline, as opposed to persuasion and results, is a
preferred means of becoming strong. Finally, it is difficult to understand the definitional standards used by the Court to define strong
and weak unions. Strikebreaking would be a relevant factor, one
would think; in categorizing a union as strong or weak. Yet the Court
assumes that this might occur in either type of union. Combining
the act of judicial enforcement of union fines with strikebreaking
aids in characterizing the union, but the value for purposes of
analysis is unclear. One could argue that a union which cannot count
on full membership support during a strike would call few strikes
and, thus, the problem raised by the Court would rarely arise.
Although the need of weak unions for the power to judicially
enforce fines is debatable, there is no doubt that expulsion can be
self-defeating. As Professor Summers has noted:
Since the union's effectiveness is based largely on the degree to
which it controls the available labor, expulsions tend to weaken the
union. If large numbers are expelled, they become a threat to union
standards by undercutting union rates, and in case of a strike, they

may act as strike-breakers .... Therefore expulsion must be limited to
very small numbers unless the union is so strongly entrenched that it
cannot be effectively challenged by the employer or another union. 64

In Allis-Chalmers the disciplined members were already strikebreakers, and, given the determination required to cross picket lines, it is
doubtful that these employees would have become even more of a
threat to the union after being expelled.
A. The Legislative History of Section 8(b) (1) (A): The Case of
the Uneasy Rider
After having decided that a literal interpretation of Section
8(b) (1) (A) would produce "extraordinary results," the Court in
Allis-Chalmers turned to legislative history to determine whether
this "extraordinary" meaning was confirmed. One has little doubt
about what the Court's investigation of that history would discover.
64 Summers, Disciplinary Powers of Unions, 3 Ian. & LAB. REL. REV. 483, 48788 (1950). Professor Summers was describing protected limitations on the power of
unions to discipline, rather than suggesting that court enforced fines would be more
useful tools for obtaining internal conformity. Indeed, in discussing strikebreaking
as a punishable offense, Professor Summers refers only to expulsion as a penalty.
Id. at 495-96.
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Although not clearly expressed, the burden is apparently on the
legislative history to affirmatively demonstrate that Congress meant
to outlaw fines for strikebreaking. Thus, the Court stated that "what
legislative materials there are dealing with Section 8(b)(1)(A)
contain not a single word referring to the application of its prohibitions to traditional internal union discipline in general, or disciplinary fines in particular. On the contrary, there are a number of
assurances by sponsors that the section was not meant to regulate
the internal affairs of unions." 65 Since court enforcement of union
fines is rare, one would expect that a search through the legislative
history would be unrewarding. Mr. Justice Black, writing in dissent,
assumed that fines do "restrain" and looked for affirmative proof
that fines were permissible under Section 8 (b) (1) (A). Since the cupboard is bare, however, the search by each group of judges merely
confirms the assumption each had before the search began. Thus,
the question asked was more important than the discoveries made."
The Court found two substantial limitations on the scope of
Section 8 (b) (1) (A) in the legislative debates. First, "Congress expressly disclaimed .. .any intention to interfere with union self-

government or to regulate a union's internal affairs."6 7 Second, the
"mischief against which the statement is weighed was restraint and
coercion by unions in organizational campaigns."68 Although both
assumptions accurately state the prime concerns and themes in the
legislative history, neither the history nor the subsequent legal development of the provision excludes other concerns.6 9
The Court dealt exclusively with debates in the Senate, although
the history of Section 8 (b) (1) (A) begins in the House with Representative Hartley's bill, H.R. 3020. The bill provided a number of
restrictions on union power, including a section which presaged the
passage of the LMRDA in 1959. Section 7 was to be amended, but
the amendment referred exclusively to internal union affairs. Thus,
members were to be given the right to be free from discriminatory
financial demands, the right to freely express their views, and to
have the affairs of the organization conducted in a manner that is
fair and in conformity with the free will of the majority of the
members. These rights were to be enforced by unfair labor practice
provisions, including Section 8 (c) (4) which made it an unfair labor
65 388 U.S. at 185-86.

66 For a similar problem involving the uses of legislative history, see NLRB v.
Fruit & Vegetable Packers, Local 760, 377 U.S. 58 (1964) ; Lewis, Consumer Picketing
and the Court-The Questionable Yield of Tree Fruits, 49 MirN. L. REv. 479 (1965).
67 388 U.S. at 184.
68 Id. at 186.
69 See text accompanying notes 17-35 supra.
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practice "to deny to any member the right to resign from the organi7o
zation at any time ....
Far reaching provisions were included in Section 12 entitled
"Unlawful Concerted Activities." Section 12 (a) (1) focused on union
activity which threatened employment, but it was seemingly directed
only to the use of force:
By the use of force or violence or threats thereof, preventing or

attempting to prevent any individual from quitting or continuing in the
employment of, or the accepting or refusing employment by, any employer; or by the use of force, violence or physical obstruction or
threats thereof, preventing or attempting to prevent any individual
from freely going from any place and entering upon any employer's
premises or from freely leaving an employer's premises and from going
71
to any other place .

'Section 8(b) (1), as it passed the House, was primarily concerned with organizational pressure and was designed to closely
parallel Section 8 (a) (1):
By intimidating practices to interfere with the exercise by employees of rights guaranteed in Section 7(a) or to compel or seek to
compel any individual to become or remain a member of any labor
organization....

As the bill passed the House, the unlawful concerted activities
72
provision, Section 12, remained in the bill.
Thus, it was an unfair labor practice under Section 12 (a) (1)
to use force or violence to prevent an employee from continuing his
employment or accepting employment. Also banned was the use of
force or threats to prevent an individual from freely going onto or
leaving the employer's premises. These provisions were not accepted
by the Senate, nor were they rescued by the Conference Committee,
but it should be noted that they were specifically directed to force
LABOR
70 H.R. 3020, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 22 (1947), reprinted in, 1 NATIONAL
AcT,
RELATIONS BOARD, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE LABOR MANAGEMENT RELATIONS

1947, at 53 (1948) [hereinafter cited as L.H.].
71 Id. § 12(a)(1), at 48, 1 L.H. at 78.
72 The direction of the House can be seen from the opening paragraph of the
House Committee Report. "American working men . .. have been cajoled, coerced,
intimidated and on many occasions beaten-up, in the name of the splendid aims set
forth in Section 1 of the National Labor Relations Act. His whole economic life has
been subject to the complete denomination and control of unregulated monopolists.
He has on many occasions had to pay them a tribute to get a job. He has been
forced into labor organizations against his will. At other times when he has desired
to join a particular labor organization, he has been prevented from doing so and
forced to join another one. . . . He has been denied any voice in arranging the
terms of his unemployment. He has frequently against his will been called out on
strikes which have resulted in wage losses representing years of his savings." H.R. REP.
No. 245, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1947), 1 L.H. at 293.
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and violence. The House Conference Committee report 7 explained
that Section 8(b) (1) (A) was intended to cover the activities specified in Section 12(a) (1) of the House bill, suggesting that Section
8(b) (1) (A) prohibits interference with employment rights of employees and, presumably, strikebreakers.
The Senate draft bill was approved in committee by a narrow
vote without many of the provisions of the House bill.74 Under the
Senate bill, as reported, it was an unfair labor practice to interfere
with an employer's selection of his representative for collective bargaining but there was no provision barring interference with an
employee's exercise of Section 7 rights. Supplemental views, however,
made it clear that amendments would be added from the floor. Thus,
Senators Taft, Ball, and Smith among others, indicated that amendments would be offered on the floor making it an unfair labor
practice to coerce employees in the exercise of rights guaranteed in
Section 7. There was, apparently, no perceived need to amend Section 7 by granting the right to refrain from the exercise of the
enumerated rights. This amendment, however, was added in joint
conference on the demand by House conferees. 75
The supplemental views were concerned primarily with coercion
exercised in organizational campaigns. Thus, the statement referred
to "many instances of union coercion of employees such as that
brought about by threats of reprisal against employees and their
families in the course of organizing campaigns; also direct interference by mass picketing and other violence. ' 76
Senator Ball moved that the present Section 8 (b) (1) be added
from the floor,77 explaining that the Section was merely parallel to
Section 8(a) (1):
The purpose of the amendment is simply to provide that where
unions, in their organizational campaigns, indulge in practices which, if
an employer indulged in them, would be unfair labor practices such as
73 H.R. REP. No. 510, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 42 (1947), 1 L.H. at 546.

74 See S. REP. No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1947), 1 L.H. at 407.

75 Senator Taft felt that the right to refrain from the exercise
of § 7 rights was
already included in § 7. He felt that "the new language, therefore, merely makes
mandatory an interpretation which the Board itself had already arrived at administratively." Similar language had appeared in the House bill, and "since section 8(b) (1)
of the Senate Bill, which was retained by the conferees, made it an unfair labor practice for labor organizations to restrain or coerce employees in the rights guaranteed
them in section 7, the House conferees insisted that there be express language in section
7 which would make the prohibition contained in section 8(b) (1) apply to coercive
acts of unions against employees who did not wish to join or did not care to
participate in a strike or picket line." 93 CONG. Rzc. 7001 (1947), 2 L.H. at 1623.
76 S.REP. No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 50 (1947), 1 L.H. at 456.
77 93 CONG. REc. 4136 (1947), 2 L.H. at 1018.
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statements, the unions shall
making threats, false promises or false
78
also be guilty of unfair labor practices.

Senator Ball's catalog of cases which would fall within the
provision dealt solely with organizational campaigns, including the
79
use of force and misrepresentation in such situations. A broader
purpose, however, is suggested by a case in which membership was
sought to be induced by the threat that initiation fees would be
80
doubled unless employees joined the union before the election. The
phrase "restraint and coercion" was clearly not intended to be
limited to threats of force."'
To the Court in Allis-Chalmers, the Senate's organizational
focus suggested that the Section did not protect union members but,
rather, only prospective members. Legislative history indicates that
although the primary thrust was directed to the use of force, mis82
statement, and threat of job loss in organizational campaigns, the
provision was not limited to this situation. Thus, the new provision
at a minimum protected union members as well as non-members
during the organizational phase. Senator Pepper, opposing the
amendment, stated that "[t]his amendment is an effort to protect
the worker against their own leaders, chosen by them under their
own constitution and bylaws."8 3 In reply, Senator Taft tended to
de-emphasize coercion of union members, and, rather, emphasized
the protection which the Section gave to all employees. However, he
always maintained that the union members were covered. "Mr.
President, let me point out that the amendment protects men who
may not be members of unions at all. In fact, many of these cases of
coercion are cases in which there never have been certification of a
Id., 2 L.H. at 1018. See also id. at 4560, 2 L.H. at 1202.
See also id. at 4398, 4558, 4560, 2 L.H. at 1139, 1199, 1203.
80 Id. at 4136, 2 L.H. at 1018. See also Id. at 4138, 2 L.H. at 1020-2 1.
78

79 Id., 2 L.H. at 1202.

81 Senator Ives offered an amendment on April 30, 1947, to delete the phrase
"interfere with" from § 8(b) (1), and it was removed by unanimous consent. Senator
Ives feared that it could be construed to include any conversation or persuasion
designed to solicit membership. Id. at 4398, 2 L.H. at 1138. The House Conference
Report (H.R. REP. No. 510, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 43, 1 L.H. 547), explains that the
omission would have no appreciable effect since, in applying § 8(b) (1) of the Wagner
Act, the Board held that acts which constitute interferences were not violations if they
did not also constitute restraint or coercion. Thus, omission of these words was not
meant to have the effect of broadening the scope of § 8(b)(1).
82 See, e.g., 93 CONG. REc. 4136-38, 4398, 4588, 4560 (1946), 2 L.H. at
1018-21, 1139, 1199, 1203 (remarks of Senator Ball). Many apparently felt that the
provisions went beyond organizational campaigns and covered elections as well. Thus,
the section was thought necessary because it was alleged that the Board would not set
an election aside because of union misconduct. In response to this allegation, Senator
Morse referred to a number of cases in which elections were set aside on the basis of
union misconduct or misstatements. Id. at 4456, 2 L.H. at 1194-95.
83 Id. at 4023, 2 L.H. at 1029.
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union ....
[Furthermore], [c]oercion is not merely against union
members; it may be against all employees." 4 Senator Taft also
stated that "[m] erely to require that unions be subject to the same
rules that govern employers, and that they do not have the right to
interfere with or coerce employees, either their own members or
those outside the union, is such a clear matter, and seems to me so
easy to determine, that I would hope we would all agree."85 Again
stressing a broader application of Section 8 (b) (1) (A) which would
apply to members as well as non-members and to non-organizational
situation campaigns, Senator Taft stated:
If there is anything clear in the development of labor union history
in the past 10 years, it is that more and more labor union employees

have come to be subject to the orders of labor union leaders. The bill
provides for the right to protest against arbitrary powers which have
been exercised by some of the labor union leaders.8 6

Another problem with the Court's approach in Allis-Chalmers
is that Section 8(b)(1) (A) refers to any violation of Section 7
rights, and the right to join or refrain from joining labor organizations is only one of the rights granted. Thus, Section 7 refers to the
right to collectively bargain and the right to take part in concerted
activities, and these rights would often be relevant to the relationship of union members to an organized union.
Senator Taft explained the addition of the amendment to Section 7 in conference as making the "prohibition contained in Section
8(b) (1) apply to coercive acts of unions against employees who
did not wish to join or did not care to participate in a strike or
picket line." 87 Ironically, strikebreaking in organizational strikes
may be far more serious to a union than the same conduct during
an economic strike by an established union. The Court avoids this
dilemma by suggesting, despite its narrow reading of Section 8(b)
(1) (A), that strikebreaking fines are generally valid whenever they
occur. 8 Indeed, the Court impliedly admits that the provision is not
limited to organizational situations. The Court upholds the fines as
not constituting "restraint or coercion" within Section 8 (b) (1) (A),
implicitly acknowledging that the right to cross picket lines is generally protected by Section 7.
84 Id. at 4144, 2 L.H. at 1029-30 (emphasis added).

85 Id. at 4145, 2 L.H. at 1032 (emphasis added).
86 Id. at 4143, 2 L.H. at 1028. See also remarks by Senator Taft, id., 2 L.H.
at
1028.
87 Id. at 7001, 2 L.H. at 1623. See also id. at 4561-62, 2 L.H.
at 1205-06 (remarks
of Senator Taft).
88 The Supreme Court has not limited the scope of § 8(b) (1) to organizational
strikes in the past. See NLRB v. Teamsters Local 639, 362 U.S. 274 (1962);
Radio
Officers v. NLRB, 347 U.S. 17 (1954).
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89
Senator Taft's remarks seem to support these assumptions.
In response to expressed fears that strike effectiveness would be
reduced by Section 8 (b) (1) (A), he stated:
I can see nothing in the pending measure which . . . would in
some way outlaw strikes. It would outlaw threats against employees.
It would not outlaw anybody striking who wanted to strike. It would
not prevent anyone using the strike in a legitimate way .... All it would
do would be to outlaw such restraint and coercion as 90would prevent
people from going to work if they wished to go to work.

It is possible that Senator Taft is only referring to organizational strikes and perhaps non-bargaining unit employees. The latter
is probably too narrow, however, as the statement seems to include
at least all non-members of the union. The difficulty comes in that
Section 7 draws no lines among members and non-members, and
Section 8 (b) (1) (A) probably applies to both. Thus, Section 7 would
seem to encompass the right of members to cross a picket line as well
as non-members. Of course, the question is the scope of that right.
It may also be possible to limit Senator Taft's remarks by interpreting "restraint and coercion" to include only force and violence.
Thus, Congress may not have been concerned about legal process.
Probably, however, Congress was concerned about the effects on
freedom of various kinds of restraints rather than the kind of
restraint used. Thus, Senator Taft stated that "[t]here are plenty
of methods of coercion short of actual physical violence."'" Examples were given of cases where a union threatened to double the
2
dues of employees who waited later to join. It is difficult to see how
fining a member is less coercive than doubling his dues, or how one
is more within the ambit of internal union affairs than the other.
If this is the approach to be taken, then fines must be included under
the phrase "restrain or coerce," since fines can have the same inhibit98
ing effect as can force or threats of bodily harm.
The second conclusion reached by the Court from its reading
of the legislative history is that Congress did not mean to regulate
internal union affairs. Indeed, this theme was repeated many times
89

See 93 CoNG. REc. 7001 (1947), 2 L.H. at 1623 (remarks of Senator Taft).

90 Id. at 4563, 2 L.H. at 1207.

91
92
98
unions

Id. at 4145, 2 L.H. at 1031.
Id. at 4137, 4559, 2 L.H. at 1020, 1200.
Further support for a reading of § 8(b)(1) which encompasses members of
stems from Senator Taft's statement that the amendment to § 7 was added by

the Conference Committee to "make the prohibition contained in § 8(b) (1) apply
to coercive acts of unions against employees who did not wish to join or did not

care to participate in a strike or a picket line." Id. at 7001, 2 L.H. at 1623. Nonmembers would normally not be -expected to participate in a strike, let alone a
picket line.
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in no uncertain terms. Senator Ball stated that the provision was not
designed to interfere with the internal affairs of a union which is
already organized: "All we are trying to cover is the coercive and
restraining acts of the union in its effort to organize unorganized

employees.1 94 Senator Holland, in proposing the proviso to Section

8 (b) (1) (A), stated: "Apparently it is not intended by the sponsors
of the amendment to affect at least that part of the internal administration which has to do with the [admission] or expulsion of members, that is, with the questions of membership. ' 9 5
As one would expect, however, conflicting statements exist in
the legislative history. Thus, Senator Wiley stated that "None of
these provisions interferes unduly with union affairs, except to the
extent necessary to protect the individual rights of employees."9 6
However, a contrary view was stated by Senator Ball in supporting
Senator Holland's proviso to Section 8(b) (1) (A). He stated that the
amendment ".

.

. is perfectly agreeable to me. It was never the inten-

tion of the sponsors of the pending amendment to interfere with the
internal affairs or organization of unions." 97 This would suggest that
Senator Ball felt that the proviso had no meaningful effect but
merely enforced what was already implied in Section 8 (b) (1) (A)
without the proviso. Under traditional statutory interpretation doctrines, however, a proviso relates to subject matter covered by the
main portion of the provision. Therefore, but for the proviso, a court
could well assume that some purely internal union affairs are included under the provision. The presence of the proviso suggests that
disciplinary powers which are not exempted by the proviso fall
within the main provision of Section 8 (b) (1) (A). Senator Ball's
comments, however, suggest that perhaps the proviso is not technically a proviso, but, rather, an attempt to clarify one question
which arose during the debates.
Perhaps Congress was only interested in excluding the power to
expel or to admit members from legal scrutiny, for these were the
only valid aspects of union power which were mentioned in the
debates and expressly inserted into the statutory language.9 8 This
would be consistent with the debates under Section 8(b) (2). Thus
Senator Taft stated:
Id. at 4559, 2 L.H. at 1200.
95 Id. at 4398, 2 L.H. at 1139. See also id. at 4144, 2 L.H. at
1030 (remarks of
94

Senator Taft).
96 Id. at 5132, 2 L.H. at 1472 (emphasis added).
97 Id. at 4400, 2 L.H. at 1141. See also id. at
4561, 2 L.H. at 1204 (remarks of
Senator Smith).
98 See id. at 4399-4400, 2 L.H. at 1139-41 (remarks
of Senator Holland).

[Vol. 17:681

UCLA LAW REVIEW

The pending measure [the union shop provision] does not propose any limitation with respect to the internal affairs of unions. They
still will be able to fire any members they wish to fire, and they will be
able to try any of their members. All they will not be able to do, after
the enactment of this bill, is this: If they fire a member for some
reason other than nonpayment of dues they cannot make his employer
of work. That is the
discharge him from his job and throw him out
99
discussion.
under
provision
the
of
only result

Thus, although a union may expel or refuse to admit, an employee's
job cannot depend upon such action. But Section 8 (b) (1) (A) must
turn on other considerations or otherwise it is superfluous since the
role of Section 8 (b) (2) is to insulate employment from union membership. It is clear that Section 8(b)(1) (A) applies to threats or
other means of intimidation to join a labor organization. It is not
difficult to stretch that to include threats of force in relation to any
other infringements of Section 7 rights.
The next question is whether or not union disciplinary action
may in a particular case amount to coercion under Section 8(b) (1)
(A). Since the proviso excludes some union conduct from NLRB
sanction, one might have expected the proviso to play a major role
in the Court's analysis. The Court, however, found that the proviso
to Section 8 (b) (1) (A) gave only "cogent support for an interpretation of the body of Section 8(b) (1) as not reaching the imposition
of fines and attempts at court enforcement. . ..

"0

Although the

Board had held that it was the proviso that protected the U.A.W.'s
fines, the Court in Allis-Chalmers reached the same result without
reliance on the proviso. The proviso was helpful, however, in reaching
its conclusion: "At the very least it can be said that the proviso
preserves the right of unions to impose fines, as a lesser penalty
than expulsion, and to impose fines which carry 0the explicit or
implicit threat of expulsion . . . for nonpayment. "1
The Court seems to hold that the proviso might indeed protect
fines, but only when they have a lesser impact than expulsion. But
the Court admits that fines can be more serious to an individual employee than expulsion. If this is the case, it seems strange that a
hypothetically lesser penalty, expulsion, would be protected by the
proviso, but fines, a greater penalty, would be protected, not because
of the proviso, but because it was not "restraint or coercion" under
the provision itself. If fines are to be protected because a union needs
to have this power to carry out the wishes of Congress as well as to
protect itself, it seems axiomatic that it also has the power to expel.
99 Id. at 4318, 2 L.H. at 1097.
100 388 U.S. at 191.
101 Id.at 191-92.
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Yet, it is precisely this power to expel which is protected by the proviso. What, then, is the purpose of the proviso? The Court seems to
imply that, first, all internal union affairs are excluded from the provision. If that is so, the proviso has absolutely no effect, for the proviso
only has operational significance if some internal union matters fall
within the ambit of the provision. If expulsion was not conduct included within the phrase "restrain or coerce," there would be need
for a proviso. The result of the Court's approach is that the proviso
is not a proviso in strictly technical sense, but merely an example
of Congressional concern that internal union affairs should be left
free of governmental interference. Although the Court defers to the
proviso to the extent that "at the very least" the proviso preserves
the right to impose fines as a lesser penalty than expulsion, the rest
of the Court's opinion implies that a union can impose fines even
if they are not a lesser penalty, for the Court makes no inquiry into
the relative impact of expulsion and fines under the facts before it.
Therefore, the proviso becomes merely a warning that "internal
union matters" must be left free of Section 8(b) (1) (A).
Finally, the Court tends to finesse the question by saying that
they are loathe to impute to Congress a "concern with the permissible means of enforcement of union fines and to attribute to Congress a narrow and discrete interest in banning court enforcement
of such fines. Yet, there is not one word in the legislative history
evidencing any such Congressional concern."1 2 Congress, however,
was indeed concerned about "means," as the addition of Section 8 (b)
clearly demonstrates. Again, the Court seems to be placing a burden
on the appellant to prove that the legislative history specifically
meant to prohibit fines.
Despite the Court's deference to the union's institutional interests, the opinion in Allis-Chalmers may have ironically opened the
door to further federal intrusion into union disciplinary proceedings.
The Court did set a number of limits to its holding but perhaps more
importantly, abolished any real distinction between court-enforced
fines and fines enforceable only by expulsion. The latter would seem
protected by the proviso, and court-enforced fines could have been
treated as a distinct means of seeking compliance to union norms.
The Court, however, treated the precise method of enforcement,
excepting violence and job discrimination of course, as irrelevant.
The proper approach to Section 8(b) (1) (A) problems, as presented subsequently, is a balancing of interests similar to that
followed under Section 8(a) (1). The Court seems headed in that
102

Id. at 192.
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direction as further analysis will demonstrate, and the Court's
reliance on "coercion" in Allis-Chalmers suggests that the balancing
formula will not accord independent significance to the proviso.
If the "coerciveness" of the union's action does not involve a consideration of the method of enforcement, then fines punishable by
expulsion will be treated similarly to judicially enforced fines.
The scope of NLRB scrutiny, then, will presumably not turn on the
method of enforcement.
Statements in the legislative history to the effect that Section
8(b) (1) would impose the same restrictions on unions that Section 8(b)(1) applies to employers103 suggest that the provision applied to union members as well as non-union members.
The Court, however, disagreed strongly with this assumption. Rather
than merely taking the case of strikebreaking fines, the result of
its approach is very nearly to exclude all internal union discipline
from the scope of Section 8(b) (1) (A). Thus, in relation to the
above argument, the Court stresses that the parallel between the
provisions is "inapplicable to the relationship of a union member to
his own union. Union membership allows the member a part in
choosing the very course of action to which he refuses to adhere,
but he has of course no role in employer conduct, and nonunion
employees have no voice in the affairs of the union." 0 4 The relevant
inquiry, however, is whether Section 8(a) (1) provides helpful
guides in interpreting the scope of employee freedom under Section
8(b) (1) (A). Subsequent discussion will prove that this is the case.
In summary, an analysis of the debates supports the broad
assumption that the section was primarily designed to protect nonmembers from threats of force or job loss. There are fairly strong
implications, however, that the sponsors viewed the section as applying to other situations as well. If the protections do extend to
members as well as non-members, however, the strong statements
concerning the avoidance of interference with the internal affairs
of unions must be explained. The only explanation is that the
Senate felt internal affairs must be left free from federal intervention
but only so long as union power, albeit exercised internally, does not
tread on federally protected rights. The introductory comments
demonstrate that the NLRB has protected union members under
Section 8(b)(1) (A) and has applied the section in non-organizational situations. Indeed, the following discussion dealing with the
scope of the Court's ruling in Allis-Chalmers will demonstrate that,
103 See S. REP. No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., 50, 1 L.H. at 456; 90
4136, 4140, 4142, 4145, 4563 (1947), 2 L.H. at 1018, 1025, 1028, 1032, 1207.
104 388 U.S. at 190-91.
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despite the broad language found in the opinion, the Court does not
exclude all union disciplinary power from NLRB scrutiny. This
approach is confirmed by the Court's Marine Workers decision. 5
in which the Court limits the area of "internal union affairs" to
conduct which does not violate federal labor policy.
In any event, confident reliance on the provision's legislative
history is not warranted for any position. Fines are nowhere mentioned. Given the rarity of court enforcement of fines, this lack
of consideration is understandable. Furthermore, Section 8 (b) (1) (A)
was added from the floor of the Senate, the Conference Committee's
report is unilluminating, and the debates contain all the weaknesses
which make them the least satisfactory aspects of legislative history.
Whether one agrees with Mr. Justice Black's dissent or not, it is
hard to completely disregard his characterization of the legislative
history as "only the remarks of a few Senators during the debate
on the floor."' 0 Much of the history of labor legislation could be
similarly criticized, however, suggesting that legislative history is
often scrutinized to support policy judgments already made.
The problem with the legislative history is that it often can be
read to support both sides. Common denominators tend to be those
general principles which are useless in concrete cases. One has his
choice of "internal union affairs," which is sufficiently comprehensive
to include (and thus protect from NLRB scrutiny) all union discipline, or the proviso, which if read literally, excludes from the scope
of Section 8(b) (1) (A) only discipline in the form of expulsion.
The key motivating factor for Mr. Justice Brennan may have
been the feeling that Congress would not have weakened unions by
preventing fines because the resultant loss of unity would have
undercut the ability of unions to carry out the Congressional design. The Court, therefore, relies on the rubric "internal union
affairs" to exclude from judicial scrutiny union discipline thought
necessary for union effectiveness. Mr. Justice Black, finding the
legislative history unilluminating, is persuaded to apply a "clear
meaning" rule in order to secure the widest possible protection for
individual freedom.
Given these problems, one is forced to look elsewhere for assistance. The LMRDA is one source, state law may be another,
and the use of analogies to other provisions of the Act are a third possibility. The latter possibility relates back to the Court's rejection
of the analogy to Section 8(a) (1) as "clearly . . . inapplicable to
105 See text accompanying notes 158-206 infra.
108 388 U.S. at 208.
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the relationship of a member to his own union." This is not obvious,
however. Of course, the union cannot be equated with the employer
since the employee participates directly in the decisions of his union.
The employee who dissents from a strike vote, however, is given
a right not to participate, just as he had a right to strike in objection to a policy of his employer. Carrying this comparison further,
it would seem useful to look at the development of Section 8 (a) (1).
After all, there was a constant refrain throughout the legislative
history that the function of Section 8 (b) (1) (A) was to impose upon
unions the same restrictions that Section 8(a) (1) placed upon employers.
B. Relevance of the Development of Section 8(a) (1): The Lost
Parallel
A look at the development of Section 8 (a) (1) immediately reveals that "restrain and coerce" is not simply a factual question
but, rather, the legal conclusion reached when employee interests
have been balanced against legitimate employer concerns. Thus,
the employer may bar solicitation during work time and may prohibit distribution in the work place, although any limitation of
employee freedom to solicit "restrains" organization in fact.10 7 A
working time rule is only presumptively valid, however, and antiunion motivation will invalidate the rule despite the fact that the
employer's valid concerns about efficiency are not necessarily affected and, importantly, despite the fact that the addition of bad
motive does not really increase the quantum of restraint on union
solicitation. Indeed, the Court has taken a similar approach in cases
under Section 8 (b). Thus, the Court has upheld consumer picketing
which urges a product boycott while holding that Section 8 (b) (4) prohibits picketing which urges a total boycott of the secondary establishment.0 " It cannot be argued that product picketing does not or
cannot "restrain" neutrals in fact, however, despite the holding that
such conduct is not "restraint" within the meaning of Section
8(b) (4).
The history of Section 8(a)(1) also reveals that Section 7
interests are often overbalanced by the employer's interest in maintaining operations or by more general policy considerations.' 9 Thus,
107

Republic Aviation Corp. v. NLRB, 324 U.S. 793 (1945).

108 NLRB v. Fruit Local 760, 377 U.S. 58 (1964).

109 NLRB v. American Ship Bldg. Co., 380 U.S. 300 (1965). An employer may
lock out his employees, preempting the union's valuable weapon of choosing the
time to strike to strengthen his collective bargaining position. Moreover, concerted
activity normally protected by § 7 is often subordinated to the interests of industrial
stability and union effectiveness. See text accompanying notes 5-7 supra,
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in Mackay it was held that an employer may permanently replace
strikers to maintain operation despite an obviously discouraging
effect on union organization.'1 °
The question, then, is whether court enforcement of fines is a
reasonable restraint on Section 7 rights. The answer unfortunately
is more difficult to formulate. Certainly union effectiveness is a
relevant consideration and is, perhaps, the counterpart of the employer's right to "protect and continue his business.""' By giving
the employer the right to permanently replace strikers, Mackay, in
effect, protects strikebreakers from the logical extension of the right
to strike. Thus, Mackay gives the employer an economic counterweight to the union's concerted activity, and also permits him to
protect strikebreakers filling strikers' jobs. Allis-Chalmers can be
seen as a parallel case. The union's interest in its effectiveness
permits it to coerce or penalize dissenters because, on balance, the
collective gain outweighs the loss of individual interests. A similar
approach is used to deny protected status to wildcat strikers, and
perhaps both groups of employees should be treated alike. This
resolution is not clearer, however, even when wildcatters are lumped
in, for acts of dissent convey valuable information to unions and
employers." 2 Submerging these interests within the union hierarchy
may aid industrial stability only temporarily, and the cost in terms
of member resentment may be high. Doctrine, however, treats both
groups of dissenters as unworthy of protection despite the fact that
their acts possess most of the attributes of protected activity.
The statement of the problem as one of the conflicting interests,
however, is an act of recognition, not solution. The NLRB must
articulate the interests which can be justifiably considered and assign
relative degrees of importance to those interests. The Court has
given significant weight to the union's collective internal-security
interest and the compatible Congressional concern that unions serve
as effective bargaining agents.
The union's interest in survival, however, is not as convincing
as one might suppose. If court enforcement of fines was critically
important, one would assume it would be' a more common occurrence
than it is. Apparently, solidarity has been sufficiently protectible
by the use of social pressure, fines punishable by expulsion, or
110 NLRB v. MacKay Radio & Tel. Co., 304 U.S. 333 (1938).
111 This suggestion was made in C. S-UmmERS & H. WELLINGTON, CASES AND
MATERIALS ON LABOR LAW 1121-22 (1968).
112 Given the spontaneous nature of many wildcat strikes, an argument exists
that wildcatters should receive a more sympathetic reception than strikebreakers. See
generally A. GouLDNER, WILDCAT STRIKE (1954).
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other forms of union discipline. Furthermore, it is not obvious that
court enforcement of fines has the effect of strengthening weak
unions. The Court stresses that strong unions may not need this
power since the fear of expulsion would be sufficiently threatening.
Yet, Allis-Chalmers involves the United Auto Workers, and so the
equation is not obvious. Any union which faces the threat of memberstrikebreakers could be considered a weak union, and strikebreaking
could be a result of that weakness rather than the cause. The union's
resort to external assistance indicates that it cannot enforce obedience internally. Strikebreakers normally disagree with the strike call
or bargaining demands, and their action, undeterred by social pressure, may reflect factional strife involving a substantial minority.
In any union, "weak" or "strong," it is doubtful whether the
imposition of fines will encourage "better" members. Fines may
encourage withdrawals from membership, either as a result of the
fines or to avoid future fines, and this would leave the union with
depleted ranks-a situation the Court wished to avoid. Even if the
members do not leave the union, as was apparently the case in
Allis-Chalmers, their attachment to the union is not likely to be
stronger. That does not mean that seeking judicial enforcement was
a wasted effort, however, for it may achieve union objectives precisely. Members may refrain from strikebreaking in the future and
other members are reminded vividly of their institutional obligations.
This result cannot be criticized if the Court is correct in determining
Congressional purpose; however, that purpose is certainly not blindingly clear in the debates. It is unfortunate that the Court rejected
contextual analogies to Section 8 (a) (1) for, ironically, developments
under Section 8(a)(1) could have supported the result in AllisChalmers.
On the other hand, the Court also overlooked the fact that the
impetus of many of the Taft-Hartley provisions was the protection of
the individual from the institutional interests of the unions. Indeed,
that concern echoed louder than the interest in collective effectiveness.
Furthermore, it is difficult to disagree with Justice Black's statement that the "fundamental error of the Court's opinion is its
failure to recognize the practical and theoretical difference between
a court-enforced fine, as here, and a fine enforced by expulsion or
less drastic intra-union means.""' 8 The fear of judicial process and
its costs will no doubt be a powerful incentive to avoid exercise of
an admitted Section 7 right. Indeed, the size of the fine may absolutely foreclose the exercise of this right rather than merely "rea118

388 U.S. at 203-04.
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sonably" limit it." 4 It is true that the Court suggests that there are

limits-fines must be "reasonable" and the offender must be a "full
member," but these qualifications are probably too vague to give
employees confidence of ultimately succeeding in the union's action
to collect the fine or in an unfair labor practice proceeding before
the Board." 5
Justice Black was doubtful that any union fine for picket line
crossing was valid, even though the fine was enforceable only by
expulsion from membership. That is, despite the fact that the proviso
permits the union to expel, he was not at all sure that Congress gave
unions the power to act by lesser means. Basically, however, Justice
Black's concern was that fines might not really be a lesser penalty.
He was especially concerned about fines because they were "a
direct economic sanction for exercising [the] right to work. [Thus],
the direct threat of a fine, to a member normally unaware of the
method the union might resort to for compelling its payment,
would often be more coercive than a threat of expulsion."" 6
Of course, the threat of expulsion alone could also "absolutely
restrain" some union members from crossing the picket lines. On
the other hand, if employees are willing to cross a picket line, they
are probably not very concerned about union membership. Finally, a
member may always resign from a union, thereby freeing himself
from the penalty provision of the union's by-laws.
In sum, the result in Allis-Chalmers seems correct although the
route traveled was not satisfactory. The collective interest in security
may outweigh the individual interest, although the court failed to
even raise this statutorily recognized concern. The interests of the
strikebreaker are the protection of his job, since strikers may
legally be replaced, and the maintenance of his income. A large
number of variables exist, however, making it difficult to estimate
the importance of these interests without particularistic fact-finding.
Most employees, for instance, may not fear replacement during their
strike effort, perhaps because they are skilled or otherwise difficult
to replace or because the employer has traditionally refused to replace
strikers. Thus, the labor history of the community, the expectations
of employees, and the state of the labor market, are all relevant
factors. Moreover, the interest in income maintenance may be less
114 A joint union brief submitted to the NLRB proposes that fines which equal
the strikebreakers' earnings should be permissible. 71 L.R.R.M. 415 (1969).
115 See 388 U.S. at 204 (Black, J., dissenting). Citing Professor Summers, the
Court seems to rely upon state courts to strike down discipline which involves a severe
hardship. Summers, Legal Limitations on Union Discipline, 64 HARV. L. REv. 1049,
1078 (1951).

116 388 U.S. at 203.

UCLA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 17:681

than critical if employees may easily find interim employment or
can expect to mitigate losses due to post-strike overtime gains. The
difficulties of accurately gauging the institutional and individual
interests may give additional support to the result reached in AllisChalmers.
C. The Relevance of State Law: A Doubtful Use of Dubious
Doctrine
The Court's resolution of the problems in Allis-Chalmers, and
its refusal to give significant weight to individual interests, is based
on its assumption that "full members" bind themselves to intra-union
discipline. Thus, the Court turns to state law and holds that court
enforcement of fines stems from the "consent" theory of internal
union affairs. Although this approach is generally discredited in the
writings," 7 it is still commonly employed. The doctrine is normally
used to determine the propriety of union action against employees.
Because state courts use the contract approach with varying degrees of strictness, results in state courts will vary. The employee,
raising a federal right, must seek vindication as a defendant in a
state court action to enforce a fine or file with the NLRB. It is
doubtful that this legal framework will encourage employees to test
their Section 7 rights.
Indeed, it is possible that the Court's opinion in Allis-Chalmers
may even affect the very state law it purports to recognize. The
Court felt that court enforcement of fines was implicit in binding
obligations. The union's by-laws and constitution are not commercial
agreements; and, indeed, courts have often required that the penalty
or means of enforcement, as well as the offense, be spelled out in
the union's laws. Since court enforcement is rare, hardly assumed,
and significantly different than expulsion and suspension, state courts
could be expected to deny court enforcement where no provision for
such action exists. The limited number of relevant cases support this
assumption. Although some state courts have enforced fines without
discussing whether the union had specific authority to proceed in
that manner," 8 court enforcement has been permitted where specifically authorized by the union charter or rules. 119
See Summers, supra note 115, at 1055-56.
118 See, e.g., Division 1478 of Amalgamated Ass'n v. Ross, 90 N.J. Super. 391,
217 A.2d 883 (1966). Defendant was fined for violation of union order prohibiting
members from entering the dispatcher's office and answering telephone calls. The
Court said that since neither the defendant's union membership nor his employment
status was involved in any way, the activity was not arguably subject to the NLRA.
11" Master Stevedores' Ass'n v. Walsh, 2 Daly 1 (New York 1867). A by-law
provided for a fine for working less than a certain wage and provided that it could
117
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Moreover, courts have denied the union's right to bring such
action in cases where it was found that the union's constitution
and by-laws did not authorize such suits. In one case a member
was fined for violation of an agreement not to work behind an
authorized picket line. 2 ° The union constitution provided for suspension or expulsion for a member who failed to pay a fine, but
there was no provision for recovery of a fine in court. The court21
held that the remedies provided in the constitution were exclusive,'
and rejected the union's action for enforcement of the fine.
Ironically, then, although the Court purported to rely on doctrines developed under state law, it may have affected its substance
by encouraging state courts to ignore the absence of court enforcement provisions in union constitutions and by-laws. Indeed, the
Wisconsin Supreme Court upheld a fine growing out of the AllisChalmers situation on the basis of the Supreme Court's analysis. 22
Not all fines will be enforced, states the Court, for the offenders
must be "full members." Not content to rely on state courts for this
protection, however, the Court reads this limitation into Section
8(b) (1) (A), suggesting that less than full members may not be
fined without violating Section 8(b) (1) (A). Thus, the Court acknowledges that court enforcement is a significant restraint of Section 7 rights. Moreover, it would seem that the employee need not
await the resolution of the state court action, for it is the institution
of the action or the threat of such action which logically restrains
within Section 8 (b) (1) (A). Again, then, the Court may have affected the contours of state law, since state courts would not be
expected to enforce fines which constitute unfair labor practices.
A union security clause does not compel full union membership,
but rather, an employee is required to become and remain a member
only to the extent of paying his monthly dues. The Court suggests
that if he does more than that, as the fined employees in AllisChalmers had, they became "full members" subject to the penalties
of the union's constitution and by-laws.
It is clear that the fined employees involved herein enjoyed full
union membership. Each executed the pledge of allegiance to the
be collected by due process of law. See also Local 756, UAW v. Woychik, 5 Wis. 2d
528, 93 N.W.2d 336 (1958), where the union brought an action to enforce a fine for
failure to picket during a strike. No argument was apparently made by the member
that the union could not resort to a court of law to enforce the fine.
120 Local 188, United Glass Workers v. Seitz, 65 Wash. 2d 640, 399 P.2d 74
(1965).
121

To the same effect, see Retail Clerks Local 629 v. Christiansen, 67 Wash. 2d

29, 406 P.2d 327 (1965).
122 Local 248, UAW v. Natzke, 36 Wis. 2d 237, 153 N.W.2d 602 (1967).
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UAW constitution and took the oath of full membership. Moreover,
the record of the Milwaukee County Court case against Benjamin
Natzke discloses that two disciplined employees testified that they
had fully participated in the proceedings leading to the strike. They
attended the meetings at which the secret strike vote and the renewed
12s
strike vote were taken.

The Court refused to "presume" the contrary because Allis-Chalmers
had not suggested that the fined employees enjoyed less than full
union membership, and, indeed, Allis-Chalmers argued that the prohibition should apply whatever the nature of the membership. If
this fact is critical, however, surely the case should have been returned to the NLRB for appropriate fact-finding. Furthermore, it
would seem advisable to place the burden of proving "full" membership on the union which is, after all, seeking to restrain employee
conduct.
The Court's opinion does not characterize employees who are
covered by a union shop provision but who refuse to accept the
formal membership rites such as oath-taking, nor does the Court
define employees under agency shop clauses. The Court merely cited
IAM v. Street,124 permitting dissenters to prevent use of their dues
for political causes they opposed, under the proposition that "dissent is not to be presumed-it must affirmatively be made known
to the union.
.5
,, But the question is not one of clearly demonstrating dissent, for strikebreaking is as clear a demonstration of
dissent as one would desire. The Court must, then, mean that a full
member's clear notice of resignation from the union is required to
escape union discipline for violation of union law.
The Court is not necessarily suggesting, as some of the dissenters on the Seventh Circuit had, that an employee waives rights
under Section 7 by joining a union. Indeed, the waiver argument
made below is difficult to fathom. The right to be free from union
fines cannot be waived upon becoming a member, because the union
would have no authority to impose the fines on an employee who was
not a member of the union. The significance of Allis-Chalmers is
that union members can be restrained from exercising Section 7
rights whereas non-members, because they are not subject to the
union constitution, are not subject to union discipline.
Because of the Court's reliance on the contract approach and
its reliance on the obligation of membership in defining Section
8 (b) (1) (A), the unenforceability of fines imposed on less than full
12
124
125

388 U.S. at 196.
367 U.S. 740 (1961).
Id. at 774.
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members can be assumed. 1 26 Yet, the Court's approach could logically lead to the conclusion that no distinction should be made between full and reluctant members. If a union must protect itself,
especially a weak union, it would see that it must protect itself
against all who belong to it, no matter what the extent of their
union participation. Moreover, the Court's concern over the depletion of union ranks would seem to apply to partial as well as
full members. To have to expel partial members would seem to
thwart the purpose of the union security clause in the first place.
Would not the Court's approach suggest that if a union could only
fine full members, the result might induce full members to become
less than full members?
The union shop provision, however, was added in 1947 and
was designed to limit compulsory membership to its financial
core. Given the addition to Section 7, employees who are forced
to join because of a union security clause would probably be
protected from union fines despite the argument that the union
interest in solidarity extends to reluctant members as well. Moreover, the voluntary-involuntary distinction does not undercut the
Court's view that internal union affairs are excluded from the provision, for internal union affairs can only be defined by a truly
voluntary relationship. One who in fact joins because of a union
security clause has joined only because the Act permits such
clauses. Thus, a true "union member" relationship is not created,
and these employees cannot be coerced into paying union fines.
Of course, union membership may realistically be "involuntary"
even in the absence of a union security clause. The union becomes
the exclusive bargaining agent if it secures the support of a majority
of the employees in an appropriate unit. One may not wish to join,
but it certainly behooves one to join and take part in internal
union activities which critically affect the lives of the employees.
Thus, in a sense, involuntary membership may realistically be
much broader than simply membership induced by a union security
clause."' This would suggest that the distinction is doubtful at best.
It also places upon the Board the difficult task which, given the
above, may be impossible.
The separation of voluntary and non-voluntary membership
under union security clauses is supported by the purposes of Sec126 The NLRB has reached a similar result in a recent case without relying on
this distinction. NLRB v. Molders, Local 125, 178 N.L.R.B. No. 25 (1969).
127 Arguably, this discussion merely confuses wise choices with involuntary
decisions. A choice may be reasonable and perhaps the only reasonable alternative,
without becoming necessarily involuntary.
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tions 8(a) (3) and 8(b) (2). The proviso to Section 8(a) (3) limits
the membership required under a union shop clause to tendering
"the periodic dues and the initiation fees uniformly required as a
condition of acquiring or retaining membership."'12 8 A union security
clause can be used for no other purpose than requiring employees
to help bear the financial burdens of their statutory bargaining
representative. The Supreme Court stated in Radio Officer's Union
9

v. NLRB:12
This legislative history clearly indicates that Congress intended
to prevent utilization of union security agreements for any purpose
other than to compel payment of union dues and fees. Thus Congress
recognized the validity of unions' concern about "free riders," i.e., employees who receive the benefits of union representation but are
unwilling to contribute their share of financial support to such union,
and gave unions the power to contract to meet that problem while
withholding from unions the power to cause the discharge of employees
for any other reason. 30

If unions are permitted to require membership under a union
security clause and rely upon this membership for imposing judicially
enforceable fines upon employees who are unwilling to participate
in union activities, the union security agreement would be used for a
purpose other than to compel payment of union dues and fees. This
seems to be the approach taken by the Court in Allis-Chalmers,
although the Court was wise to look beyond the mere existence of a
union security clause to see whether the fined employees actually
participated in union activities. This suggests that involuntary mem-

bers can be fined, but those fines could be enforceable only through
threats of suspension or expulsion from membership. The member
fined under such circumstances is not compelled to pay the fine, but
only to choose whether to obey the union rule or lose union membership. On the other hand, it is possible that the only limitation on
union security clauses is that the union may not threaten or cause
a discharge as long as dues are tendered. It could still be argued
that involuntary members must pay fines as long as their jobs are
not affected, since the primary aim of the statutory provisions is to
insulate employment from union activity. Irrespective of the scope
of Section 8(b)(2), however, the Court has apparently made the
voluntary-involuntary distinction critical for Section 8 (b) (1) (A).
The Court, however, draws no clear line between full and partial
membership. Justice Brennan stresses that the Allis-Chalmers' em128

National Labor Relations Act, 1947, ch. 120, § 8(a) (3), 61 Stat. 140, as

amended, 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (1964).
129 347 U.S. 17 (1954).
180 Id. at 41.
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ployees executed a pledge of allegiance to the U.A.W. constitution
and took the oath of full membership,'3 but it is not clear whether
taking the pledge and the oath was a "voluntary act by the employee
with full knowledge of its consequences or was merely the automatic
and unthinking response of an individual covered by a collective
bargaining contract making membership a condition of continued
employment."13 2 As pointed out above, membership can hardly be
deemed voluntary when it is the only way to participate in legislative and political decision-making which affects the rules of the work
place, 8 3 and oath-takers may not realize that their action may permit judicial enforcement of union fines.
Besides the "full member" condition to the application of the
Court's decision, the opinion notes that it does not purport to determine "[w] hether § 8(b) (1) (A) proscribes arbitrary imposition of
fines, or punishment for disobedience of a fiat of a union leader.
".1
The Court does not explain what constitutes "arbitrary"
punishment or "fiat" or why the factor should be relevant to a
determination under Section 8 (b) (1) (A).
The factor is apparently important for the Court, however, for
it was repeated in Scofield v. NLRB.13 ' The Court in Scofield upheld
union fines against members who exceeded union-created production
quotas, in part, because the union's rule was "duly adopted and not

the arbitrary fiat of a union officer

....

1"3

To the extent that the

union's action violates its own organic law, of course, state courts
would refuse to enforce. the fine. Again, however, the institution of
an action to enforce a fine rather than its resolution, should be the
critical event. Since some union fines can validly be enforced in
state courts, the mere institution of the action will not bring Section
8(b) (1) (A) into play unless the Court's standards of validity are
violated. The NLRB, therefore, is obliged to review the procedural
regularity of the rule's adoption for this will be an important factor
in determining the boundaries of legality. Unfortunately, the case
by case method of determining these questions will certainly not
give assurance to dissenting employees, nor does it aid labor organizations which desire to remain within the boundaries of the law.
A further relevant criteria is, apparently, the amount of the fine.
131 388 U.S. at 196.
132 Christensen, supra note 55, at 275.
133 See, e.g., Blumrosen, Legal Protection Against Exclusion from Union Activities,
22 OHIO ST. L.J. 21, 25 (1961), where the author argues, in a different context, that
membership is critical to ensure that decisions reached treat all employees fairly.
134 388 U.S. at 195.
135 394 U.S. 423 (1969), discussed in text accompanying notes 207-231 infra.
136 Id.
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Justice Brennan stated that "it is not argued that the fines for which
court enforcement was actually sought were unreasonably large,"'1 7
implying that unreasonable fines may be vulnerable to attack.
Recently, fines were levied against four members of a radio-television employees' union amounting to $14,000, $12,000, $11,400 and
$10,600.118 A local of the Bakery and Confectionary Workers union
139
assessed six members $1000 each purportedly for strikebreaking.
How is the Court or NLRB to determine a reasonable fine? The
harm to the union's institutional interests caused by strikebreaking
can hardly be estimated in dollars. Furthermore, if fines and indeed
the whole area of internal union affairs are to be excluded from the
prescription of Section 8(b) (1) (A), as the Court implies, how can
an exception be made for arbitrary fines? Obviously, despite the
sweeping language of the opinion, not all fines even for strikebreaking will be protected from sanction under Section 8 (b) (1) (A).
Again, however, the Court fails "to recognize the practical and
theoretical difference between a court-enforced fine, as here, and
1 40
a fine enforced by expulsion or less drastic intra-union means.'
[F]ines [could] be so large that the threat of their imposition will
absolutely restrain employees from going to work during a strike. Al-

though an employee might be willing to work if it meant the loss of
union membership, he would have to be well paid indeed to work at

the risk that he would have to pay his union $100 a day for each day
worked. Of course, as the Court suggests, he might be able to defeat the
union's attempt at judicial enforcement of the fine by showing it
was "unreasonable" or that he was not a "full member" of the union,
have the courage or financial means to be
but few employees would
141
willing to take the risk.

The spectre of the NLRB regulation of the amount of union
fines has stirred union concern. The AFL-CIO and the Alliance for
42
Labor Action have filed a joint position statement to the NLRB.1
A key portion of that brief argues that although the entire area of
union fines should be excluded from NLRB scrutiny, fines, if they
are to be regulated at all, should extend to the amount strikebreakers
can earn during the strike. In other words, the fine should remove
17 388 U.S. at 193 n.30.
138 N.Y. Times, Oct. 11, 1967, at 95, col. 4. The New York Times article quoted
an official of the union as stating that "the fines were not the highest ever imposed

by the union against its members and 'are in no sense precedent-making.' "
'39 NLRB v. Bakery Workers Local 300, 167 N.L.R.B. No. 76 (1968), enforced, 411 F.2d 1122 (1969).
140 388 U.S. at 203-04 (Black, J., dissenting).
141 Id. 204. A trial examiner has recently upheld a fine levied by Local 2390,
CWA, even though the fine exceeded gross wages earned behind the local's picket line.
AFL-CIO News, Jan. 24, 1970, at 2, col. 4.
142 71 CCH LAB. L. Rr. 1 415 (1969). See also I.A.M. v. NLRB, 180 N.L.R.B.
No. 135 (1970).
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all the benefits received by the strikebreaker as the result of his
violation of union rules. Such an approach would deter the crossing
of picket lines entirely, the precise fear stated by Justice Black.
It is true that consideration of the amount of fines would place
the NLRB in a thicket, resulting in time-consuming litigation of
dubious value. The Court upheld fines since they might be a lesser
penalty than expulsion, but that does not necessarily suggest that
fines must be less coercive than expulsion to be valid. First, that
determination would generally be extremely difficult to make sure;
the "cost" of expulsion and the "value" of membership is incalculable. Second, the thrust of the Court's opinion is to validate
fines, if "reasonable," even though they are more onerous than
expulsion. The N.A.M. has suggested that the employee be given a
choice between a fine or expulsion. 4 ' An employee might choose
expulsion, informing us which he feels is less punitive, and yet the
Court's opinion stresses that unions should not be limited to expulsion and the subsequent depletion of its ranks. Since the amount of
the fine is directly proportional to the protection of the institutional
concern in solidarity and effectiveness, it is unclear when a fine will
be so high as to be unreasonable and, thus, an unlawful "restraint."
Perhaps this matter might best be left to state courts determining
the scope of the "contract" in union actions to enforce such fines.
A further difficulty with the Court's opinion in Allis-Chalmers
is the definition of restraint. Any union activity which restrains the
exercise of Section 7 rights would seem to fall within Section
8 (b) (1) (A). Thus, if not protected by the proviso, even the threat
of fines punishable only by expulsion would theoretically constitute
restraint. Justice Brennan reasoned that collecting a fine by court
action is on its face no more restraint and coercion than collecting
a penalty for non-payment of taxes or damages for breach of contract. This implies that it is the means of enforcement which is the
key to the operation of Section 8(b) (1) (A), because, of course,
justifiable legal action cannot be deemed "coercive." But the Court
subsequently makes clear that its holding goes beyond the means
of collection and involves an inquiry into the substantive justification for the union rule itself. The Court assumes that an employee will be deterred from strikebreaking because of the threat
of court enforced fines, because the Court was concerned that a weak
union have the power to seek judicial enforcement of fines. Since
physical violence cannot be used against an individual who wished
to cross a picket line and exercise his Section 7 right, the decision
fails to establish why a somewhat more civilized and less dramatic,
143

Id.
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but nevertheless effective, device for obtaining the same result is
not a restraint within the statutory phrase. As Professor Christensen
has observed, the Brennan opinion "says little more than the lesser
penalty could not have been regarded by Congress as a restraint
because it is a penalty which must be and is accepted as an integral
part of member's relationship to this union."' 4 Although union
constitutions typically penalize strikebreaking, "enforcement of a
fine by court action simply cannot be accepted as a means of discipline which has been historically or realistically present as an
element of the union-member contract."1 4 The rarity of union ac-

tions to enforce fines makes it difficult to believe that the union and
the member implicitly accepts the possibility of court enforcement
of their "contract."
The Brennan opinion represented the views of only four members of the court as Justice White concurred. Justice White seemed
to assume that the act protected the right to cross picket lines and
felt that the difference among the justices stemmed from different
evaluations of the relative harshness of court enforcement on one
hand and expulsion of the other. Since the Court seemed unanimous
in upholding a rule against crossing picket lines during strikes and
its enforceability by expulsion, Justice White thought the Court's
opinion was the "more persuasive and sensible construction of the
statute and I therefore join it, although I am doubtful about the
implications of some of its generalized statements."' 46
Predictability is muddied by the following statement:
I do not mean to indicate, and I do not read the majority
opinion otherwise, that every conceivable internal union rule which
impinges upon the § 7 rights of union members is valid and enforceable by expulsion and court action. There may well be some

rules which on their face are wholly invalid and uneninternal union
147
forceable.

Justice White, thus, did not read the majority as excluding the
entire area of internal union affairs from the ambit of this statute.
Where that dividing line should be drawn is certainly unclear, but it
may well be what the Court had in mind.
D. The Relevance of the LMRDA: Problems of Accommodation
Another external source to which the Court could have looked
for assistance is the LMRDA of 1959. The LMRDA attempted
to insure democratic and fair processes in the conduct of union
144

Christensen, supra note 55, at 269.

145
146

Id.
388 U.S. at 198-99.
Id. at 198.

147
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affairs, and the Court felt that its passage in 1959 demonstrated
that union self-government was not regulated in 1947. Of course,
the question is much narrower, i.e., whether the aspect of union
self-government involved in Allis-Chalmers falls within the ban of
Section 8(b)(1)(A). The Court noted that Congress expressly
recognized that a union member may be "fined, suspended, expelled
or otherwise disciplined and enacted only procedural requirements
to be observed."'4 8 It does not follow, however, that fines which

satisfy the procedural provisions of the LMRDA thereby satisfy
the substantive provisions of the NLRA.
Moreover, fines for strikebreaking do not solely affect internal
union affairs. The Allis-Chalmers employees were fined for going
to work, that is, for refusing to take part in a union activity. The
Court may be implying, although it nowhere asserts, that the procedural protections of Section 101 (a) (5) of the LMRDA are to be
the only protection in cases of union fines. Such a view would be
unjustified, however. The passage of this procedural provision in
1959 hardly established that no substantive limitations were created
in 1947. Indeed, Title I expressly states that it does not limit pre49
viously existing rights or remedies under state or federal laws.
The LMRDA approached internal union problems in radically
different manner than prior labor legislation. The rights granted
are stated in terms of a citizen's democratic and constitutional rights,
and enforcement of much of the Act is left to private litigation.
Title I of the LMRDA, protecting individual rights of speech, assembly, and fair treatment, did not attempt to establish a comprehensive code of rights for union members. Rather, the act was
50
intended to create minimum standards. 1 Congress was aware that
the act supplemented a body of state law and expressly recognized
this extensive development as a concurrent source of rights and
remedies. 5 '
148 29 U.S.C. § 411(a) (5) (1964). One question would be whether the union penal
provision in this case is clear enough to satisfy § 101(a) (5). State courts often interpreted vague provisions to protect democratic rights and notice may be a requirement
under § 101(a) (5), the due process provision. Constitutional parallels can be used to
argue that overly broad or vague provisions deter the exercise of protected rights. The
chance of federal court review, however, may not actually affect the deterrence created
by the imposition of union discipline. See Atleson, A Union Member's Right of Free
Speech and Assembly: InstitutionalInterests and Individual Rights, 51 MINN. L. REV.
403, 473 (1967). In cases of strikebreaking, however, members can hardly complain
that they had no notice of the potential consequences of their acts since penal provisions were vague.
149 Labor Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959 § 103, 29 U.S.C.
§ 413 (1964) [hereinafter cited as LMRDA].
150 See generally Atleson, supra note 148.
151 See, e.g., LMRDA §§ 103, 306, 403, 603, 604, 29 U.S.C. §§ 413, 483, 523, 524

(1964).
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Title I provides explicit recognition of union institutional interests, and the specified rights may be limited by reasonable rules
regarding membership obligations to the union as an institution.
Strikebreaking, urging members to support or join a rival union,
or filing decertification petitions would seem to violate a member's
obligation to the union as an institution and, therefore, discipline
for such conduct would not seem to violate the speech and assembly
provisions of Title I. In attempting to accommodate the LMRDA
and the NLRA, it is arguable that permissible discipline under one
act should pass muster under the other. 15 2 Reasonable rules may
legally infringe rights otherwise granted under LMRDA Title I.
Since these federal rights would not seem less important than the
"right to refrain" under the NLRA, reasonable
union discipline
should arguably be treated similarly under the NLRA.
Attempts at accommodation, however, merely state the problem
since it is not clear that court enforced fines are "reasonable" under
either act, or that Congress was more aware of this method of
enforcement in 1959 than it was in 1947. Section 101 (a) (5) does
refer to "fines," but neither in the Act nor in the legislative history
are court enforced fines mentioned. Indeed, challenged discipline
under these provisions have normally involved expulsion or lesser
focus of discipline such as suspension. 5 ' Even the express recognition of institutional interests in Title I, permitting limitation of
protected rights, merely describes a typography similar to Section
8(b)(1)(A) which also expressly permits some union discipline.
Thus, although strikebreaking would seem to be a proper object
of union discipline under the language and history of Section 101
(a)(2) of the LMRDA, not all methods of enforcements or all
penalty provisions will necessarily be held reasonable.'
Finally, permissible union discipline under the LMRDA does
not necessarily validate the activity under the NLRA. First, the
LMRDA grants rights to members not unions; thus, a holding that
court-enforced fines do not violate a union member's Title I rights
is not the same as a holding that the union has a right to impose the
discipline.' 55
152 This view has been tentatively presented by Professor
Wellington. See Hearings on Oversight of Administrative Agencies, before Subcomm. on Separation
of Power
of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. pt. I, at 163 (1968).
153 See, e.g., Ryan v. IBEW Local 134, 361 F.2d 942 (7th Cir. 1966),
cert. denied,
385 U.S. 935 (1966); Salzhandler v. Caputo, 316 F.2d 445 (2d Cir.
1963), cert. denied,
375 U.S. 946 (1963); Rosen v. D.C. 9 Painters, 57 L.R.R.M. 2401 (S.D.N.Y.
1964).
154 See, Atleson, supra note 148, at 465.
155 See, NLRB v. SuCrest Corp., 409 F.2d 765 (2d Cir. 1969), where
special dues
assessments had complied with LMRDA § 101(a) (3), but, nevertheless,
the compulsion
to pay these dues violated §§ 8(b)(2) and 8(a)(3).
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More importantly, although Title I rights are limited by institutional obligations, the NLRA expressly permits members to ignore
or disobey union standards or procedures. Thus, although strikebreaking or dual unionism may properly lead to expulsion, the union
cannot affect the dissenter's employment status. The right to cross
picket lines is protected by Section 7 and even the imposition of
fines may effectively deter such conduct. The right to file de-certification petitions would seem to be protected by the Taft-Hartley rights
to join and support labor unions or to refrain from union activities.15 These rights would seem to protect union members who wish
to change their bargaining representative. Yet, such conduct is adviolative of a member's obligation
mittedly disloyal and presumably
to his union as an institution. 51 7
The proper approach is not to limit rights embodied in Section
7 by obligations owed to the union, but, rather, to define those
obligations so as not to conflict with federal law. This formulation
does not, admittedly, clear up the fog, but it does suggest that the
LMRDA is a less than perfect indicator of rights under the NLRA.
Congress' primary concern in passing the LMRDA was to protect individual rights-surely much the same argument can be made
for Section 8 (b) (1) (A) -and this suggests that an accommodation
liberally protecting individual rights is necessary. Thus, although
the protection of the union's right to discipline strikebreakers in
Allis-Chalmers helps define the scope of Title I of the LMRDA,
impermissible discipline under Section 8(b) (1) (A) must also be
impermissible under Title I.
V. MARINE WORKERS: THE RETREAT FROM ALLIS-CHALMERS
The confusion generated by the Court's decision in Allis-Chalmers returned to haunt the Court in the Marine Workers case in
1968.1'8 Realizing that its earlier language was too sweeping, the
Court wrote a narrower opinion which clarifies Allis-Chalmers,
although the maneuver could accurately be deemed a retreat.
In Marine Workers an employee, Edwin Holder, was charged
with the violation of the international union's constitution which
provided that:
156 Atleson, supra note 148, at 478-83.
157 Support for a rival union during a representational election, for instance, may
well be protected under the NLRA. See Dunau, Some Comments on the Bill of Rights
of Members of Labor Organizations, in N.Y.U. 14TH ANNx. CONp. ON LABoR 77, 84-85
(1961).
158 NLRB v. Marine Workers, 391 U.S. 418 (1968).
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Every member . . . considering himself . . . aggrieved by any
action of this Union, the [General Executive Board], a National Officer, a Local or other subdivision of this Union shall exhaust all
remedies and appeals within the Union, provided by this Constitution,
before he shall resort to any court or other tribunal outside of the
Union.15 9

Holder had filed charges with Local 22 accusing its president
of violating the international constitution. Local 22 found that its
president had not committed the alleged violation. Without pursuing
the intra-union appeal procedure which provided for appeals to the
general membership, to the Executive Board, and finally to the
national convention, Holder filed an unfair labor practice charge
with the Board based on the same facts as his earlier charges filed
with the union. He alleged that Local 22 had violated Sections
8(b) (2) and 8(b) (1) (A) "by causing U.S. Lines to discriminate
against him because he had engaged in certain protected activities
with respect to his employment by U.S. Lines." 16 He was then
charged with violation of the Union's constitution and by-laws,
found guilty, and expelled from the Local. He appealed, and the
General Executive Board affirmed the Local's action. He then filed
another unfair labor practice charge, alleging that his expulsion for
filing the earlier charge violated the act. This unfair labor practice
charge generated the instant case.
The Board, following an earlier decision, held that the union's
action was an unfair labor practice. In Local 138, IUOE'6 ' the Board
had held that "the act confers on any person the right to file an
unfair labor practice charge, that a fine is by nature coercive, and
hence, that the union's imposition of the fine against Skura for
filing a charge with the Board was violative of his statutory
rights."162 In Marine Workers the NLRB ruled that union discipline
which coerces members, whether by fine or expulsion, is
...unlawful when administered to punish employees who file unfair
labor practice charges with the Board seeking redress of their
grievances against the union or its officials, and is immaterial to this
holding that the charges were filed with the Board in contravention of
this union's constitutional or by-law provisions compelling exhaustion
of internal union procedures before resort to the Board's processes. 163

The union was ordered to cease and desist from expelling members
159 Id. at 420-21.

1o0 NLRB's Petition for Certiorari at 4-5, NLRB v. Marine Workers,
391 U.S. 418
(1968).
161 148 N.L.R.B. 679 (1964).
162 See also NLRB v. A.B. Roberts, 148 N.L.R.B. 674
(1964); NLRB v. WellmanLord, 148 N.L.R.B. No. 81 (1964).
163 159 N.L.R.B. 1065 (1966).
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for filing charges with the Board and to reinstate Holder without
any loss of status.
The Third Circuit, however, read the proviso literally and set
aside the Board's order. It found that the union's rule only required
that the union be given a fair opportunity to correct its own wrong
and, therefore, did not offend public policy or impede the normal
and proper administration of the act.
The Supreme Court upheld the NLRB, finding access to the
NLRB more important than the asserted values of intra-union
exhaustion of remedies. Since access to the NLRB was involved,
the Court found that Holder had stepped out of the shadowy confines
of internal union affairs and into the public domain.
Justice Douglas dealt first with a "threshold" question raised
below as to adequacy of Holder's first charge filed with the NLRB.
Before determining whether the right to file charges was protected
in this situation, the Court found it necessary to ask whether Holder's
charge was a "sufficient way to allege an impairment of section 7
rights." This was summarily dealt with, however, as the charge was
found to be within the ambit of Section 7 because no party had
questioned it before the NLRB.
The Court's language is unsatisfying, for it suggests that not all
employees filing charges with the NLRB will receive federal protection. Because of the Court's reference to the question as a
"threshold" step, the Court may have impliedly affirmed the approach suggested by the NLRB that the charges must only be
' 16 4 Alternatively, the Court
brought "honestly and in good faith.

may require that the employee's charge "adequately" allege a violation of Section 7. If the Court is willing to reject the values of
exhaustion of intra-union remedies, it should not place upon the
employee the risk that his "honesty and good faith" might be questioned or that his view of the NLRA may be incorrect. This may
not be a substantial risk, but it may nevertheless deter some employees from approaching the NLRB, a consummation the Court
did not desire. Moreover, since the right protected is one of access
to the NLRB, the precise nature of the employee's charge seems
irrelevant.
Turning to the merits, the Court distinguished Allis-Chalmers
on the ground that Section 8 (b) (1) (A) assured self-regulation only
where "legitimate internal affairs" are concerned. Filing unfair
labor practice charges, unlike strikebreaking, was affected by para164 Brief of NLRB at 17, NLRB v. Marine Workers, 391 U.S. 418 (1968).
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mount considerations of public policy. "The overriding public interest
makes unimpeded access to the Board the only healthy alternative,
except and unless plainly internal affairs are involved."' 61 5
Furthermore, "a whole complex of public issues was raised by
Holder's original charge." Since the charge implicated the employer
as well as the union, internal union proceedings could not fully
explore the public issues involved nor could they provide comprehensive remedies. "There cannot be any justification to make the
public processes wait until the union member exhausts internal procedures plainly inadequate to deal with all phases of a complex
problem concerned with the union, and employee member."' 6 6
The policy of free access to the NLRB was recently affirmed
in Nash v. Florida Industrial Commission6 7 where the Court held
that Florida's policy of denying unemployment compensation
to
employees who filed unfair labor practice charges against their
employer restrained employees in the exercise of their rights to file
charges with the Board. The Court explained that unions and employers are forbidden to engage in coercive activities which have
"a direct tendency to frustrate the purpose
of Congress to leave
people free to make charges of unfair labor practices to the
66
Board."'
This policy has received explicit statutory recognition, but
only in relation to employer retaliation. Section 8(a) (4) makes
it
an unfair labor practice for an employer to discriminate against an
employee because he had filed charges under the Act. It has long
been recognized that an employer's interference with an employee's
resort to the Board may constitute a violation of "the general prohibition in Section 8(a)(1) against coercion of employee in
the
exercise of the right guaranteed in section 72"169 Similarly, it has
been held that an employer violates this section by encouraging or
inducing employees to withdraw charges filed with the Board.7 °
One of the expressed purposes of Section 8(b) (1) (A) was to
165 391 U.S. at 424.
166 Id. at 425.
107 389 U.S. 235 (1967).
168 Id. at 239.
169 See Vogue Lingerie, Inc. v. NLRB, 280 F.2d 224,
226 (2d Cir. 1960). See also
Gibbs Corp., 131 N.L.R.B. 955, 963 (1961), enforced, 308 F.2d
247 (5th Cir. 1962);
Pacific Intermountain Express Co., 110 N.L.R.B. 96, 108-09
(1954), enforced, 228
F.2d 170 (8th Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 351 U.S. 952 (1956).
170 Clearfield Cheese Co., 106 N.L.R.B. 417 (1953), enforced,
213 F.2d 70 (3d Cir.
1954). Similarly, employers violate the act by deterring employees

from testifying
truthfully in Board proceedings; Jackson Tile Mfg. Co., 122 N.L.R.B.
764 (1955),
enforced, 272 F.2d 181 (5th Cir. 1959), or by demanding, in advance
of trial, copies of
statements which employees had given to the Board investigators.
Texas Industries,
Inc., 139 N.L.R.B. 365 (1962), enforced, 336 F.2d 128 (5th
Cir. 1964).
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impose upon union conduct restrictions comparable to those Section
7
8 (a) (1) imposes upon employers.' ' The Court, however, had earlier
rejected the parallel between the two provisions. In Allis-Chalmers
Justice Brennan had rejected the view that there was a close parallel
between Section 8(a) (1) and Section 8(b) (1) (A): "However apposite this parallel might be when applied to organizational tactics,
it clearly is inapplicable to the relation of the union member to his
own union."'1 72 Yet, in InternationalLadies Garment Workers Union
v. NLRB, the Court itself had concluded that by adding Section
8(b) (1) (A) Congress intended to "impose upon unions the same
on employers with
restrictions which the Wagner Act imposed
7
3
rights."'
employee
of
violations
to
respect

A question arises because Congress provided a specific bar
against employer interference, but did not specifically outlaw union
interference. 174 A similar provision was considered in 1947, but the
conference committee deleted a paragraph which made it an unfair
labor practice to fine or discriminate against
* . . any member, or subject him to any . . . penalty, on account of
his having criticized, complained of, or made charges or instituted proceedings against, the organization or its officers or on account . . .
of his having supported or failed to support any proposition submitted
175
to the labor organization or to citizens generally for a vote.

This provision would have been much broader than a mere prohibition against union discipline for filing a charge, and, therefore, its
deletion throws little light on Congress' view of that particular
practice. It is possible that Congress thought it was unnecessary
to make specific that which might be already an unfair labor practice
under Section 8(b) (1).176 Indeed, Section 8(a) (4) itself probably
only made specific what was implicit under Section 8(a) (1). Consistent with this approach, the Board has long held that a union
unlawfully restrains and coerces when it threatens an employee with
physical violence or job loss because he has filed charges with the
77
Board or has decided to give testimony in a Board proceeding.
Moreover, the Board had expanded its reading of Section 8 (b) (1) (A)
171 See, e.g., 93 CoNG. REc. 4142 (1947), reprinted in, 2 L.H. supra note 70, at
1025 (remarks of Senator Taft) ; Id. at 4136, 2 L.H. at 1018 (remarks of Senator Ball).
172 388 U.S. at 190-91.
173 366 U.S. 731, 738 (1961).
174 See Roberts v. NLRB, 350 F.2d 427, 428 (D.C. Cir. 1967).
175 H.R. 3020, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. § 8(c) (5) (1947) (Hartley Bill), reprintedin,

I L.H., supra note 70, at 180.
176 See Roberts v. NLRB, 350 F.2d 477, 428 n.1 (D.C. Cir. 1947).
177 See Int'l Ass'n of Bridge Workers Local 84, 112 N.L.R.B. 1059, 1060 (1965);
Borda & Co., 125 N.L.R.B. 1335, 1336 (1959), enforced, 288 F.2d 132 (D.C. Cir. 1961)
Local 450, Operating Engineers, 122 N.L.R.B. 564, 568 (1958), enforced, 281 F.2d 313,
317 (5th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 366 U.S. 909 (1960); Textile Workers, 108 N.L.R.B.
743, 749 (1954), enforced in relevant part, 227 F.2d 409, 411 (D.C. Cir. 1955).
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to include expulsion for filing charges with the Board despite the
proviso, since expulsion entails the loss of union strike funds, pension
and insurance benefits and loss of a voice in the decisions made by
his collective bargaining representative. 7 8 The Court, then, read
Section 8(a)(4)'s protection into Section 8(b)(1). If retaliation
by an employer violates Section 7, then union retaliation should
also be protected under Section 8(b) (1) (A).
Unlike the cases dealing with employers, however, the union's
rule in Marine Workers did not deny access to the NLRB but
merely delayed the invocation of NLRB assistance. Despite the fact
that courts have long recognized the value of internal union exhaustion, the judicially created exceptions have tended to swallow up the
rule.'7 9 Moreover, the NLRA itself provides in Section 10(a) that
the Board's power to remedy unfair labor practices "shall not be
affected by any other means of adjustment or prevention that has
been or may be established by agreement, law, or otherwise." The
NLRA supports a policy of promoting promptness in filing charges
since Section 10(a) forbids issuance of a complaint based upon
conduct occurring more than six months earlier. 8 °
As stressed by the Court, however, the key factor is that union
181
procedures are inadequate to give effect to the policies of the Act.
Although the individual's charge may trigger an unfair labor practice proceeding, the scope of the proceeding is not limited to the
violation there alleged. The complaint may encompass numerous
related unfair labor practices discovered in the course of investigating the charge. 8 1 Once invoked, the Board's power to adjudicate and
remedy violations may not be restricted by the private agreement of
the parties. 8 The individual's conception of an adequate remedy
for the deprivation of his statutory rights may not coincide with the
Board's which is charged by Congress to administer the Act in the
public interest.
178

Cannery Workers (Van Camp Sea Food Co.), 159 N.L.R.B. 843, 846 (1966).

179 See Summers, The Law of Union Discipline: What the Courts Do in Fact, 70

L.J. 175, 210 (1960).
180 29 U.S.C. § 160(b).
181 Similar views have affected judicial views dealing with substantive protections
under the LMRDA. See Atleson, supra note 148, at 465-470.
182 See NLRB v. Fant Milling Co., 360 U.S. 301 (1959). Ironically, the involvement of the employer in this case actually cuts in favor of the union's rule. If the
unfair labor practice charge involves union attempts to cause the employer to discriminate against the employee, complete relief can probably be obtained in an unfair
labor practice proceeding against the employer under § 8(a) (3).
188 See Lodge 743, IAM v. United Aircraft Corp., 337 F.2d 5, 8-11 (2d Cir.
1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 908 (1965); Electrical Workers, Local 613 v. NLRB,
328 F.2d 723, 727 (3d Cir. 1964) ; NLRB v. Local 450, Operating Engineers, 275 F.2d
413 (5th Cir. 1960).
YALE
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Moreover, an individual's charge against his union is often
coupled with the corresponding charge of job discrimination against
the employer, as was Holder's in this case. Both employer and the
union may be made parties, and the question of motives of both can
be resolved in a single proceeding and comprehensive and coordinated remedies may then be imposed. These issues cannot be fully
explored, nor can such effective remedies be provided, in an internal
union proceeding to which the employer is not a party.
Holder may have been able to secure protection under LMRDA
Section 101 (a) (4) which prohibits a union from limiting the right
of any member to institute an action in any court or before any
agency. This section prohibited those restrictions on the right to sue
which courts had generally regarded as contrary to public policy.
State courts have looked with a jaundiced eye upon all discipline
which restricted the members' freedom to use the judicial process. 184
Indeed, members were protected not only when a member was found
to have a good cause of action; he was protected as long as his suit
was brought honestly and in good faith. 18 5
The judicial hostility to union restrictions on access to courts
is not inconsistent with the judicial doctrine that a court will not
entertain a member's action until a member has exhausted all reasonable remedies within the union. This is a rule of judicial administration and applies to actions involving the internal affairs of all
forms of voluntary associations, as well as to actions upon contracts,
such as collective bargaining agreements.' 8 6 Unlike the union's rule
on exhaustion, which has a deterrent effect on a member's resort to
a court, the judicial doctrine merely permits a court, after the
member had freely resorted to it, to make a judgment as to whether
the issue presented might adequately be resolved under the union's
own procedures. The courts, however, have created many exceptions,
and "by applying the exceptions [they] have sapped the rule of
87
1
almost all vitality except in random cases."'

The problem, however, is that Section 101(a) (4) contains a
proviso which states that any member "may be required to exhaust
reasonable hearing procedures (but not to exceed a four-month
184 See Summers, Legal Limitations on Union Discipline, 64 HARv. L. REV. 1049,
1068 (1951).
185 Id. at 1068.
186 Cox, Internal Affairs of Labor Unions Under the Labor Reform Act oj 1959,
58 MicH. L. REV. 819, 839 (1960).
187 Summers, The Law oj Union Discipline: What the Courts Do in Fact, 70
YALE L.J. 175, 210 (1960). See also Summers, Legal Limitations on Union Discipline,
64 HARv. L. REV. 1049, 1086-1092 (1951).
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lapse of time) before instituting legal or administrative proceedings
against such organization or any officer thereof. ..."
A logical reading of the entire provision would suggest that
unions could require a member to follow union appeal procedures
for a four month period before instituting legal proceedings. This
reading seems consistent with the language as well as Congressional
desire to encourage internal union responsibility. 18 The Court,
however, interpreted the proviso as merely fixing the outer limits
of the traditional judicial doctrine of exhaustion of remedies. 8 9
Thus, the proviso is not a grant of authority to unions with which
to compel a four month exhaustion period, but a "statement of
policy that the public tribunals whose aid is invoked may in their
discretion stay their hands for four months, while the aggrieved
person seeks relief within the union."'9 0
It is interesting that the Court found it necessary to discuss
Section 101 (a) (4). The rights created by Title I of the LMRDA,
including the right to sue under Section 101 (a) (4), are enforceable
in federal court. No matter how the proviso is to be read, it is a
limitation on the right to sue under Title I and does not necessarily
limit rights under the NLRA. Section 103 of the LMRDA provides
that nothing in Title I "shall limit the rights and remedies of any
member of a labor organization under any State or Federal Law or
before any tribunal or other tribunal."'' Despite rather conflicting
statements in the generally unilluminating legislative history, Congressman Griffin clearly stated:
[T]he proviso was not intended to limit in any way the right of a

union member under the Labor-Management Relations Act of 1947, as
amended, to file unfair labor practice charges against a union, or the
right of the NLRB to entertain such charges, even though a four19 2
month period may not have elapsed.
188 See Sheridan v. Carpenters Local 626, 306 F.2d 152 (3d Cir. 1962).
189 See, e.g., Detroy v. American Guild of Variety Artists, 286 F.2d 75 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 366 U.S. 929 (1961). See Blumrosen, The Worker and Three Phases
of Unionism: Administrative and Judicial Control oj the Worker-Union Relationship,
61 MIcH. L. REV. 1435 (1963) ; Christiansen, supra note 55, at 254-58; Sherman, The

IndividualMember and the Union: The Bill oj Rights Title in the Labor-Management
Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959, 54 Nw. U.L. REv. 803 (1960).

190 NLRB v. Shipbuilding Local 22, 391 U.S. 418, 426 (1968). Interestingly, the
Court's reasoning that exhaustion could not be required because of the inability of
union tribunals to give complete relief has been used in LMRDA cases to excuse even
the limited four-month judicial exhaustion doctrine. Detroy v. American Guild of
Variety Artists, 286 F.2d 75, 79 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 366 U.S. 929 (1961).
191 See Int'l Ass'n of Machinists v. King, 335 F.2d 340, 347 & n.29 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 379 U.S. 920 (1964). See also § 603(b) of Title VI of-the LMRDA, 29
U.S.C. § 523(b), which provides that nothing in the earlier titles shall be construed to
"impair or otherwise affect the ...

rights ...

Labor Relations Act, as amended."
192 105 CONG. REC. 18152 (1959).

of any . . .person ...

under the National
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Furthermore, the NLRB has not developed an exhaustion doctrine similar to that of the courts. Interestingly, one court has held
that Section 101 (a) (4) is violated when discipline is imposed on
a member who files charges with the Board without exhausting
intra-union remedies.' This would suggest that Section 101 (a) (4)
protects access to relief whether the right sought to be vindicated is
based upon the LMRDA or not. This is a dubious extension of
Section 101 (a) (4), and Marine Workers demonstrates that the
NLRB can protect itself.
Since the right protected in Marine Workers is the public right
to access to the NLRB, the precise form of union discipline accorded
employees exercising this right should not be relevant. Thus, although fines were involved in Marine Workers, the policy of that
case is broad enough to include expulsion as well, despite the proviso.
Public policy, then, limits the proviso, for otherwise expulsion would
seem to be without the proscriptions of the Act. This narrowed
reading of the proviso is consistent with the Court's admission in
Allis-Chalmers that expulsion could be a more severe sanction than
the imposition of fines.
Despite the Court's emphasis on the right of access to NLRB
processes, the NLRB had not previously defined the right involved
in the same manner. Rather, it has described the right as one of
compelling obedience to the act. This reading is important, for it
provides the NLRB with the theoretical justification for distinguishing between access to Section 8 and Section 9 of the Act. Thus the
Board has found no violation of the Act when a member was disciplined for filing a petition under Section 9 (c) (1) (A) (ii) to decertify
the union as the bargaining representative.' 9 4 The Board held that
there was "a fundamental distinction between union disciplinary
action aimed at the filing of charges seeking redress for asserted
infringement of statutory rights . . . and union disciplinary action

aimed at defending [the union] from conduct which seeks to
undermine its very existence.'

95

The issue is important since many

union constitutions and by-laws require members to exhaust internal
union procedures governing intra-union disputes before resorting to
judicial or administrative litigation.'96
193 McGraw v. United Ass'n of Plumbers, 341 F.2d 705 (6th Cir. 1965). See also
Ryan v. I.B.E.W., 361 F.2d 942 (7th Cir. 1966) (expulsion for instituting an action
before exhaustion invalidated).
194 Tawas Tube Products, Inc., 151 N.L.R.B. 46 (1965), enforced, Price v. NLRB,
373 F.2d 443 (9th Cir. 1967).
195 United Steelworkers Local 4028, 154 N.L.R.B. 692, 696 (1965).
196 See U.S. LABOR DEP'T, BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, DISCIPLINARY POWERS
AND PROCEDURES IN UNION CONSTITUTIONS, 28 (Bull. No. 1350, 1963). "Premature
resort to civil courts, considered by some to be a flagrant display of disloyalty was
specifically prohibited in 64 constitutions. The grave consequences of this conduct were
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In justifying such disparate treatment, the NLRB has stated
that:
In the fluid rather than fixed circumstances of a contest for support, the union and its adherents can perform their legitimate function
effectively only if they are unified. To Tequire them to tolerate an
active opponent within their ranks would undermine their collective
action and thereby tend to distort the results of the election. To permit the union and its members to discipline the hostile members is
therefore not inconsistent with the purposes of the Act and impinges on no legitimate interest of others ....197

The employee who files a decertification petition attacks the
very existence of the union as an institution, and the union may
expel such a member who otherwise would remain privy to the union's
strategy. 9" The power to discipline, then, is considered a necessary
defensive weapon. Moreover, the NLRB feels that an employee
who seeks to decertify the union hardly values his union membership and, this, his expulsion from the union would not effectively
deter his resort to the Board. If this were true, then the NLRB's
approach would be a reasonable resolution of the need to protect
access to the NLRB on one hand and the union's need to defend its
status on the other. The problem is that the non-deterrent effect of
expulsion is debatable; if the decertification attempts fail, the employee may be stuck with the current bargaining representative.
If the right to file an unfair labor charge is included in the right
granted in Section 7, then the right to attempt to decertify a union
could well be included also. After all, such action is arguably part
of the right to refrain from "engaging in concerted activities for
the purposes of collective bargaining." However, the Board's "preservation of the union's existence" rationale is similar to the rationale
adopted by the Court in Allis-Chalmers, that is, the right to fine
strikebreaking is necessary for union effectiveness. But even an
unfair labor practice charge can adversely affect group goals, such
as a charge filed during an election campaign which induces the
NLRB to stay the election. The Board's approach would probably
also apply to a member who filed a Section 9(c) (1) (A) (i) representation petition, since a petition to certify a rival could prove just
as effective as a decertification petition in undermining an incumbent's existence. 99 Again, however, the right to file decertification
also illustrated by the number of times it appeared as a ground for summary discipline." Id. at 32.
197 Cannery Workers Union, 159 N.L.R.B. 843, 850 (1966).
198 Price v. NLRB, 373 F.2d 443, 447 (9th Cir. 1967).
199 The Board seems to have adopted this position in Cannery Workers Union,
159 N.L.R.B. 843, 849-50 (1966), where it broadly distinguishes cases arising under
§ 8 of the act from cases arising under § 9.
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petitions would seem to fall within the rights encompassed by Section 7, since Section 9 rights do not seem less important than those
expressed in Section 8. Indeed, to an employee at odds with his
union, Section 9 rights may be vastly more important. If even a
relatively mild union exhaustion rule is invalid when applied to
employees who file unfair labor practice charges, it is hard to see
how discipline can be permitted for employees exercising rights
under Section 9.
The NLRB's approach, however, does roughly approximate the
approach taken in Section 101 (a) (2) of the LMRDA which permits
union discipline to enforce obligations owed to a union as an institution. Since a union has little raison d'6tre if it does not possess collective bargaining functions, a member who files a decertification
petition challenges the union as an institution. As argued earlier,
however, discipline may be improper under the NLRA even though
the same union conduct does not violate Title I of the LMRDA. The
recognition of institutional interests in Title I is directed to the scope
of Title I rights which are not coterminous with rights under the
NLRA.
The NLRB's rationale, then, turns on its belief that access to
the NLRB is not deterred by the threat of expulsion, since membership cannot be highly valued by one who wished to undermine the
union's representative status. Although the NLRB fails to appreciate the value of being able to participate in union affairs, the
union does have a justifiable interest in removing from its midst one
who is actively seeking to destroy its bargaining status. Since the deterrent effect of expulsion is unclear, and the union's interest strong,
the Court will probably uphold the NLRB even though expulsion
may have some effect on access to the NLRB. Surely, however,
expulsion for filing decertification petitions would not be unexpected
by the dissenting member and it would not violate his expectations.
Such an approach would make the scope of Section 8(b)(1) (A)
consistent with the LMRDA. If the Court upholds the NLRB's
approach, however, it must be on the ground that access to representation proceedings is not unreasonably restrained by expulsion.
The NLRB's attempted distinction between the right to invoke
Section 8 and Section 9 seems inconsistent with the thrust of Marine
Workers and is, moreover, inconsistent with the policies of the Act.
The NLRB has recently broadened its approach to coincide
with the thrust of Marine Workers by holding that fines for circulating a decertification petition violated Section 8 (b) (1) (A).2oo The
200

NLRB v. Molders, Local 125, 178 N.L.R.B. No. 25, 72 L.R.R.M. 1049 (1969).
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NLRB held that the imposition of fines does unlawfully restrain
members from seeking access to the Board's processes while expulsion has only a minimal deterrent effect. 2 ' The NLRB corrected its
previous suggestion that access to procedures under Section 9 was
not protected. No doubt responding to the broad language in Marine
Workers, the NLRB held that the right involved is access to the
procedures of the NLRB, whether the member seeks to secure
"obedience to the act" under Section 8 or to avail himself of selfhelp remedies under Section 9. Moreover, the NLRB found the
relevant question to be the deterrent effect of the union's form of
discipline. Thus, the NLRB held that fines are punitive, rather
than defensive, and the effect of fines is to discourage access to the
NLRB rather than to defend the union. Expulsion is proper since
the employee should not be able to remain a member, having access
to the union's strategy, while campaigning against the union.20 2
Of course, the prime motivation for any form of discipline in a
decertification case may be to discourage the activity. The NLRB,
however, has deemed this motivation improper and has defined the
20 3
union's only valid interest as one of immediate self-protection.
The NLRB's distinction between expulsion and fines is reasonable in this context, despite its seeming inconsistency with AllisChalmers. The Court upheld union fines in that case, partly on
the ground that expulsion, expressly protected by the proviso, could
be a greater penalty. In cases involving the filing of unfair labor
practice charges, the0 4NLRB has also rejected a distinction between
fines and expulsion.

2

The suggestion in Allis-Chalmers that fines may be less onerous
201 There was evidence in this case that expulsion was indeed a non-existent
threat. The employee did not appear before the trial board or before the membership,
although she was afforded an opportunity to do so. Instead, she wrote the union that
the petition was being circulated in accordance with NLRB advice and that ". . . if
you feel you want to suspend me from your union . . . be my guest." Id. at n.9, 72
L.R.R.M. at 1050 n.9.
202 A recent trial examiner's decision deals with a case falling between expulsion
and fines. An employee was prevented from attending union meetings but was not
otherwise expelled. This question remains unanswered, however, as the examiner relied
upon the union's threat to seek the employee's discharge. United Steelworkers Union
Local 4186, Case No. 3-CB-1192 (Oct. 22, 1969).
203 Oddly, the NLRB did not rely upon the fact that the dissenting member was
not a "full member" but, rather, limited her participation to tendering dues under the
union shop clause. Allis-Chalmers implied that such "financial core" members could not
be fined under § 8(b) (1) (A) for violating union rules.
204 See Cannery Workers Union, 159 N.L.R.B. 843 (1966). The union may not
punish members who seek NLRB assistance in the guise of fines or strikebreaking fines.
For a case involving strikebreaking and unfair labor practice charges, see NLRB v.
Bakery & Confectionary Workers Local 300, 167 N.L.R.B. No. 76 (1967), enforced,
411 F.2d 1122 (7th Cir. 1969).

1970]

UNION FINES AND PICKET LINES

than expulsion seems no more than a makeweight. Initially, one
would assume that fines would be a greater deterrence to protected
activity since strikebreakers are obviously aware of the significance
of their actions and the likelihood of expulsion. In any event, any
qualitative estimate of the relative severity of expulsion and fines is
nearly impossible.
The NLRB, however, has now recognized that fines for filing
decertification petitions exceed union power under Section 8 (b) (1)
(A). It cannot be assumed that fines provide greater deterrence to
this type of action than to strikebreaking. The explanation, then, must
lie with the union's interest. The NLRB has limited this concern to
the removal of troublemakers by expulsion, while prohibiting effective deterrence. In Allis-Chalmers, however, fines were upheld partly
on the ground that expulsion would not be an effective deterrent.
This apparent conflict may be explained by focusing on the nature
of the conduct involved and the impact of this conduct on the union.
The cases may well be consistent, assuming a balancing approach as suggested herein, if filing decertification petitions deserves
greater protection than strikebreaking. As already noted, the Court
in Allis-Chalmers did not even discuss the individual right to refrain
from union activity protected by Section 7, yet the interest in access
to the NLRB in Marine Workers swept away a union exhaustion
rule. The conclusion, then, is that the Court and the NLRB have
given great weight to traditional notions of access to legal tribunals,
weight exceeding that given to express rights in the act.
The legal dislike for limitations on the rights of access to legal
institutions is long standing, and the Court's deference to this interest is understandable. Moreover, this difference in weight accorded
dissenting conduct could also be explained by its impact on the union.
Strikebreaking presents the union with an immediate threat to its
exercise of concerted activity, rights also protected by Section 7 of
the NLRA.2 5 The impact on the union, therefore, also affects the
public interest in collective bargaining. On the other hand, the
union's interest in deterring decertification petitions is not as strong.
Although union security is consistent with the policies of the Act,
the union's interest may be inconsistent with the majority's wish to
replace the union with another. Union deterrence in this case, then,
does not draw its essence from Section 7. Congressional objectives
of effective collective bargaining can only be carried out if employees
are represented by unions of their own choosing.
205 Strikebreaking also has a more recognizable economic impact on union members than filing decertification petitions since the strike may thereby be prolonged.
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In noting that Marine Workers limited union disciplinary power
because of the policies of the Act, two aspects of this case should
not go unnoticed. First, despite its language, the Court probably
balanced the possible interference with the Act's remedial processes against the value of the union's asserted interest. The union's
attempt to require exhaustion of internal remedies before a member resorts to an outside tribunal is far from illegitimate. Although
judicial economy and efficiency support traditional doctrines,
substantial values exist for the association as well. The exhaustion rule encourages internal resolution of disputes and permits
higher authorities to uniformly apply the association's policies.
200 The
Moreover, exhaustion may save the expense of litigation.
benefits of encouraging a responsible and efficient internal settlement procedure also benefits the public at large, for unions provide
important power centers in a pluralistic society. Thus, the result
in Marine Workers could have been more reasonably reached by
analogizing Section 8(b)(1)(A) to the development under Section
8(a)(1).
A second aspect of Marine Workers is that union discipline was
limited not because of the impact on individual interests but, rather,
because of the institutional structure of the Act. The point is significant because in neither Allis-Chalmers nor Marine Workers did
the Court feel inclined to discuss the effect of the challenged discipline upon the individual, despite the presence of Section 7. Although
this point will be discussed further in the next section, it is disturbing to note that institutional interests have been used to permit or
prohibit union discipline, with little recognition of the individual
concerns at stake.
VI.

SCOFIELD

v. NLRB-A

FURTHER CLARIFICATION

Two years after the Court's decision in Allis-Chalmers the
0 7 The
Court was faced with yet another union fine situation.
Scofield case was somewhat easier than Allis-Chalmers, but the
Court indicated that it had clarified some of its thinking. The decision in Scofield was seven to one20 8 and the absence of concurring
opinions suggests that some of the Allis-Chalmers dissenters had
accepted the majority's views. Mr. Justice Black, the lone dissenter,
relied upon his earlier dissent.
The union in Scofield represents production employees, some
200 See generally Chafee, The Internal Affairs of Associations Not for Profit, 43
HARv. L. REv. 993, 1003 (1930).
207 Scofield v. NLRB, 394 U.S. 423 (1969).
208 Justice Marshall did not take part in the decision.
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of whom are paid on a piece work or incentive basis. In 1938 the
union had initiated a ceiling on the production for which its members would accept immediate piece-work pay. This was done by a
gentlemen's agreement at the beginning, but since 1944 the union
rule has been made enforceable by fines and expulsion. At present,
members may produce as much as they like each day, but may only
draw up to the union-determined ceiling rate. The additional production is "banked" by the company, that is, wages due are retained
by the company and paid out to the employee for days on which the
production ceiling has not been reached because of machine breakdown or some other reason.
The following description illustrates the operation of the banking system. When an employee is unable to produce because his
machine is not operating, the contract provides that the company
will compensate him at either the "machine rate" or the lower
"day rate," depending upon the specific reasons for non-production.
At these times, the union permits the member to draw upon his bank
and, thus, by collecting for work previously produced but not reported for compensation, permits the employee to earn the higher
ceiling rate for the period during which he produced nothing. The
company permits the employee to "bank" excess production for later
payment providing that all banks are depleted by annual inventory
time. If the member demands to be paid in full each pay period
over the ceiling rate, the company will comply, but the union will
assess a fine of one dollar for each violation. Cases of repeated
violation may result in fines up to $100 for "conduct unbecoming
a union member." Failure to pay the fine may lead to expulsion.
The banking system is realistically part of the agreement since
the parties have bargained about it in the past and the employer
participates in this system. A "machine rate" is guaranteed to each
employee, and, the parties in the past have bargained about the
margin between the machine rate set by the contract and the ceiling
rate set by the union. Management must obviously consider the
ceiling rate during its negotiations. The ceiling rate, then, has become part of the law of the shop. 2°9 Indeed, the company has regularly urged the union to abandon the ceiling. Moreover, the parties
have bargained over the ceiling rate and the company has at various
times extracted from the union promises to increase the ceiling
rate.2 10
209 See United Steelworkers Union v. Warrior & Gulf Nav. Co., 363 U.S. 574
(1960).
210 The 1944 Union by-law required that members "turn in no more than two
cents per hour over and above machine rates." This rule has remained in force over
the years with minor modifications, but the ceiling has been raised several times as a
result of collective negotiations with the company. At the time of the Board proceed-
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The instant case arose in 1961 when a random card check by the
union showed that petitioners, among others, had exceeded the production ceiling. They were fined from $50 to $100 and were suspended
from the union for a year. When they refused to pay, the union
brought an action in state court to collect the fines. The Board found
that the NLRA had not been violated, and the Seventh Circuit and
Supreme Court affirmed.
Like Allis-Chalmers, this case involves sensitive issues going to
the core of labor-management relations. Management opposes ceilings as an invasion of managerial prerogatives. Unlike management's opposition to the expansion of the obligation to bargain in
21 ' the production limitation here
good faith in cases like Fibreboard,
is unilaterally set by the union. The spectre of featherbedding and
make-work practices raises public policy questions in an economy
where productivity reigns as a supreme virtue.
Employees, on the other hand, have often felt the need for
production ceilings. The practice is an old one, predating union
development. Tacit limitations on productivity exist in many work
places, and such practices are undoubtedly considered critical by
employees working under incentive systems. Despite the logic of
an incentive system which rewards higher production, the logic of
workers often concludes that "higher production would only lead
the company to raise the piece rates, cancelling out whatever addi'
The immediate stimuli
tional earnings they might have made."212
to restrictions of output may be protracted periods of unemployment
which demonstrate that the market cannot absorb all of the workers'
efforts, retiming of jobs or rate cuts requiring the worker to deliver
additional work at lower rates of pay. The workers' interest, then,
ing, the ceiling rate was between $.45 and $.50 per hour above the machine rate. Brief
for Respondent at 4 n.3, Scofield v. NLRB, 394 U.S. 423 (1969).
211 Fibreboard Paper Prod. Corp. v. NLRB, 379 U.S. 203 (1964).
212 A. TANNENBAUM, SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF THE WORK ORGANIZATION 67 (1966).
This restrictive norm often applies to group members who produced at levels below
informal norms as well as to those who exceeded it. "Low producers were called
'chiselers' and were admonished for not carrying their own weight." Id.
The famous Hawthorne research reported that the formation of a tight-knit group
in the relay-assembly test room seemed to be responsible for an increase in productivity. F. ROETHLISBERGER & W. DicxsoN, MANAGEMENT AND THE WORKER (1964).
Increased productivity is not the inevitable result of the formation of cohesive groups,
however, as groups may be formed in opposition to the organization. A. TANNENBAUM,
supra, at 65. The group provides support for members who oppose the introduction of
innovations in work methods, for instance. See, e.g., Coch & French, Overcoming
Resistance to Change, 1 HUMAN RELATIONS 512 (1948). An observed tendency of
cohesive work groups is not greater or lesser productivity than workers in non-cohesive
groups, but, rather, a greater uniformity in productivity. This uniformity is brought
about by pressures against deviancy, perhaps even more effective than union fines. See
id. See also A. ETZIONI, MODERN ORGANIZATIONS, ch. 4. (1969); S. MATHEWSON,
RESTRICTION OF OUTPUT AMONG UNORGANIZED WORKERS (1931); S. SEASHORE, GROUP
COHESIVENESS IN THE INDUSTRIAL WORK GROUP (1954).
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is not to increase production, but, rather, to keep the supply of labor
and its output down.
Since employees might create such production ceilings even
without union sponsorship and encouragement, the element of union
solidarity and effectiveness is not as critical as in Allis-Chalmers.
The union does have an institutional interest, however, independent
of its role as an enforcer of employee group mores. Without ceilings,
jealousies among members, especially between old and young, proficient and average, affect the internal security of the union. Even
the absence of a union institutional interest, however, would not bar
consideration of the work place rules as counterweights to the employer's interest in productivity. The Act is aimed at employees
primarily, and union activity is protected as a means of insuring
that worker demands and concerns receive attention and protection.
In referring to Allis-Chalmers, the Court said that it had
"distinguished between internal and external enforcement of the
union rules" and held that "Congress did not propose any limitation
with respect to the internal affairs of unions, aside from barring
enforcement of union's internal regulations to affect the members'
employment status." This distinction between internal and external
enforcement was not so clearly expressed in Allis-Chalmers, nor is it
consistent with the Court's recognition of competing public policies
in Marine Workers. The Court provides little guidance for distinguishing between "external" and "internal" enforcement of union
rules, and the return to this troublesome dichotomy is difficult to
fathom.
The distinction stems originally from the NLRB's opinion in
Minneapolis Star and Tribune Company213 where the Board held that
a union could fine a member for violating a rule against working during a strike but that same rule could not be enforced by causing the
employer to exclude him from the work force or by affecting his
seniority without violating Sections 8(b)(1), 8(b)(2), 8(a)(1)
and 8(a)(2). In agreeing with the NLRB, the Court categorized
these sections as a "web of which § 8(b)(1) (A) is only a strand
preventing the union from inducing the employer to use the emoluments of the job to enforce the union's rule. 21 4 This statement seems
to give Section 8(b) (1) (A) no independent significance, since Section 8(b) (2) expressly protects against job discrimination.2 1 5 Fur-

thermore, the Court has moved from an inquiry into the substantive
218 109 N.L.R.B. 727 (1954).
214 394 U.S. at 429.
215 This limited construction of § 8(b) (1) (A) is reinforced by a footnote, n.5,
which refers to insulating employee jobs from their organizational rights. See Printz
Leather Co., 94 N.L.R.B. 1312 (1951).
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validity of the union rule, considered in Allis-Chalmers, to a question
involving the means of enforcement. Yet, even the Court admits that
"internal" rules fall within the provision if the union uses force or
violence.

216

The Court's acceptance of the "internal-external" dichotomy
in Scofield and its attribution of this standard as the basis of AllisChalmers is perplexing. Although the NLRB did stress this distinction in its brief in Allis-Chalmers, the Court did not rely on
this rationale. This rejection was wise since the test is unworkablemany kinds of union discipline have effects which radiate beyond the
union-member relationship. The Board must also avoid an undue
emphasis on job rights in defining the scope of Section 8(b) (1) (A)
for, as mentioned above, such a reading would make Section 8(b)
(1) (A) simply a mirror image of Section 8 (b) (2). Moreover, such a
limited reading would be inconsistent with the prohibition of
violence even when job rights are not involved and inconsistent
with the implied restrictions on union discipline imposed by the
Court itself in Allis-Chalmers.
To further muddy the waters, Mr. Justice White, after sweeping "internal union affairs" out of Section 8 (b) (1) (A)'s ambit, and
after stressing that the question turns on the union's means of
enforcement, turns to an inquiry into the substantive validity of the
production ceiling. The reader is reminded to follow what the Court
does rather than what it says, for, as in Allis-Chalmers, the Court
has apparently determined that its role is to determine the "reasonableness" of the union's restraint. This is the only reasonable explanation for the Court's action as the broad language about "means"
and "internal union affairs" is simply inconsistent with an investigation into a union rule's substantive validity. The Court would have
reached the same position if it had attempted to analogize Section
8(b) (1) (A) in light of the development of Section 8(a) (1).
Despite his early language, then, Mr. Justice White expressly
rejected an emphasis on the particular sanction imposed rather than
the union rule itself, holding that the Board should judge the fairness
of particular union rules. "[I]t has become clear that if the rule
invades or frustrates an overriding policy of the labor laws the rule
may not be enforced, even by fine or expulsion, without violating
§8(b) (1)."1217 The Court, thus, places a limit even on the provisothere is a certain category of rules which, despite their enforcement
by expulsion, will not be protected by the proviso. Just as there are
216 394 U.S. at 428.
217 Id. at 429.
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restraints which do not fall within the provision, as in Allis-Chalmers,

some restraints which do fall within Section 8 (b) (1) (A) will not be
protected by the proviso despite their enforcement by expulsion.
Note that this is inconsistent with the Court's earlier statement that
the need is merely to distinguish between internal and external enforcement of union rules. The Court has now clearly shifted the
inquiry from one involving the means of enforcement to an inquiry
into the substantive validity of the union rule.
Thus, another layer of statutory gloss has been placed on the
provision, creating a difficult set of questions. The Court must now
determine whether the union's policy is within the "legitimate interest" of the labor organization and whether it violates an overriding
policy of the labor laws. Marine Workers can then be explained on
the ground that the union had no legitimate interest, or, more accurately, insufficient interest, in frustrating an important Congressional policy of protecting access to the NLRB. Although the union
in Allis-Chalmershad a valid interest in seeking a united front during
a strike, there was a countervailing interest which received little
attention, i.e., the explicit recognition in Section 7 of an employee's
right to refuse to participate in concerted activities. Moreover, the
strikebreaker is interested in the wages he would lose if he respects
the strike and picket line. Indeed, since the employer can validly
hire permanent replacements, his very job was at stake. The union's
interest in Allis-Chalmers may well have been greater than the
interest in internal exhaustion of remedies relied upon in Marine
Workers, but surely express statutory safeguards are entitled to as
much respect as considerations of policy. The disturbing aspect of
Allis-Chalmers was the failure of the Court to consider as a valid
interest in its calculations the rights of members to cross picket lines
without "restraint or coercion."
The Court's explanation of Allis-Chalmers as being based upon
"internal" means of enforcement suggests that the Court is not
aware of the inconsistency of its approach in that case and in Marine
Workers and, indeed, Scofield. The enforcement of a productionceiling rule is surely as "internal" in nature as a rule against strikebreaking, and both cases involve the scope of employee freedom
from union rules which touch upon Section 7 rights. This suggests
that the decision in Allis-Chalmers might have taken on a far different complexion if it had not arisen first. In any event, Marine
Workers and Scofield suggest that a balancing of institutional and
individual interests is called for under Section 8 (b) (1) (A), although
the Court's reference to the "internal-external" dichotomy Will cause
confusion in the future.
Assuming that a balancing of interests is the proper approach
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in union disciplinary cases, critical questions arise concerning the
operational effect of the proviso. The proviso seems designed to
represent institutional interests, although legislative history does
suggest that the proviso may have no real independent significance.
The Court assumes this is so, and it generally ignores the proviso.
Another unresolved question arising from both Allis-Chalmers
and Scofield is the Court's reference to union rules which are "duly
adopted and not the arbitrary fiat of a union officer .

,,2.I
In

Scofield the Court states that "§ 8(b)(1) leaves a union free to
enforce a properly adopted rule which reflects a legitimate union
interest, impairs no policy Congress has imbedded in the labor laws,
and is reasonably enforced against union members who are free to
'
leave the union and escape the rules." 219
The Court thus suggests
that a punitive union rule must be properly adopted to pass muster
under Section 8(b) (1) (A). Does the Court simply mean that the
rule must be adopted in a manner which is consistent with the
union's by-laws and which, therefore, could be enforced in state
courts, or does the Court seek to impose a higher standard in those
cases where democratic rights are not adequately protected under
the union's by-laws? Common law courts often read by-laws so that
they protected democratic rights. The Landrum-Griffin Act protects
against invasions of various specific democratic rights and against
invidious discrimination, but goes no further.
The Court's approach suggests that external standards will not
be applied. The Court assumes that union members bind themselves
to policies and procedures adopted by the majority. Apparently, they
can only be bound by those rules which are adopted by methods
prescribed in the by-laws. Since the Court requires that membership
be voluntary before union sanctions may be validly imposed, the
Court seems to reject any external standard of proper adoption.
Thus, if the union's by-laws are complied with, the member is bound
to union discipline as long as the discipline is not inconsistent with
federal labor policy. The converse, however, is not necessarily true
-enforcement of every invalid rule cannot violate Section 8(b)
(1) (A). Enforcement of a rule which involves only "internal union
affairs," as defined by the Court, would not seem to run afoul of
Section 8 (b) (1) (A) for the rule would not infringe a right protected
Id. at 428.
Id. at 430 (emphasis added). The "free to leave" statement is also unclear,
since all members are free to resign under current labor law provisions. Various
unions, however, require notice of resignation or acceptance by some official before the
action is final. State courts will have to wrestle with questions involving when an
employee has satisfactorily removed himself from the ambit of union disciplinary
power, and the Court suggests that the NLRB will have to make the same inquiry.
218
219
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in Section 7. Yet, inexplicably, the Court seems to suggest that if the
rules in Allis-Chalmers or Scofield had been invalidly adopted, the
enforcement of these rules would have been an unfair labor practice.
Specifically, the Court upheld the anti-strikebreaking rule as being
within the ambit of "internal union affairs" and, therefore, not within
Section 8(b) (1) (A). Yet the Court implies that "internal union
affairs" will not protect a rule, albeit "internal," if it is improperly
adopted. Obviously, the method of adoption does not affect the
"internal union" nature of the situation nor does it relate to the
amount of coercion involved. The "internal" rubric, then, may then be
a rationalization for a decision reached on other grounds. The method
of adoption is relevant, however, to the doctrinal basis of the Court's
opinions-the contract theory of union membership. Union members
are simply not bound by procedurally invalid union rules. The Court
will use federal law to protect against the enforcement of such bylaws, despite the fact that state courts probably would not enforce
such rules anyway. The approach of the Court hearkens back to the
judicial development of Section 8 (a) (1), where employer motivation
may invalidate an otherwise valid rule even though the amount of
"factual" restraint remains the same. The criterion, then, is a
relevant factor, although its importance remains to be determined.
The "properly adopted" condition again raised questions about
the significance of the proviso. The method of adoption would seem
relevant for the proviso also. If a court found that the enforcement
of a union rule by expulsion was coercion under Section 8 (b) (1) (A),
and if the proviso had any operational significance, it should protect
the enforcement of this rule. 220 The Court, however, implies that the
proviso would not validate even expulsion if the rule was improperly
adopted. Thus, despite the literal language of the proviso, it cannot
be used to immunize action under an invalid rule.
Turning to the application of these principles to Scofield, the
Court states that the union had cleared four possible obstacles:
220 Some courts had interpreted the proviso to shield expulsion from judicial
inquiry. In American Newspaper Publishers Ass'n v. NLRB, 193 F.2d 782 (7th Cir.
1951), aff'd on other grounds, 345 U.S. 100 (1953), the union threatened to expel
members for violation of the rules forbidding them to work in a shop with nonmembers. Even though this expulsion might involve a loss of employment and other
economic benefits, the court upheld the rule. "Members could be expelled for any reason
and in any manner prescribed by the organization's rules, so far as § 8(b) (1) (A) is
concerned." 193 F.2d at 800-01. See also NLRB v. Amalgamated Local 286, UAW, 222
F.2d 95 (7th Cir. 1955), where the union's threat to deprive members of group and
hospitalization insurance coverage because they had refused to pay various union
disciplinary assessments was upheld under the proviso. Yet, the court felt compelled to
further argue that "restrain or coerce" did not encompass internal affairs of unions.
But if internal union discipline was not among the prescribed restraints, then the court
had no need to rely on the proviso.
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In the case at hand, there is no showing in the record that the
fines were unreasonable or the mere fiat of a union leader, or that
the membership of petitioners in the union was involuntary. More-

over, the enforcement of the rule was not carried out through means
unacceptable in themselves, such as violence or employer discrimination. It was enforced solely through the internal technique of union

fines, collected by threat of expulsion or judicial action. The inquiry
must therefore focus on the legitimacy of the union interest vindicated
by the rule and the extent to which any policy of the Act may be
221

violated by the union-imposed production ceiling.

As mentioned before, the Court provides no guidelines, nor are
any readily obtainable, to determine whether a fine is unreasonable
or not or whether membership was involuntary or voluntary.222 The
Court adds a fourth point-whether the means used were unacceptable. There is no doubt that violence in relation to Section 7
rights was banned by Section 8(b)(1) (A). Employer discrimination, despite the Court's discussion of it, is generally encompassed
by Section 8 (b) (2). The last stage of the inquiry concerns a balancing of the union's interest and the policies of the Act, ignoring again
the statement at the beginning of the opinion that the question was
merely one of internal or external enforcement. Indeed, this is a
case of "internal enforcement" according to the Court's reading of
Allis-Chalmersl Despite the fact that the Court ultimately upholds
the production-ceiling rule, it felt compelled to proceed further and
scrutinize the substantive justification for the rule. Such an approach
is consistent with the theme of this article, and the Court's failure
to explain clearly what it is doing is baffling.
The Court upholds the rule on obvious grounds. First, the Court
notes that union opposition to unlimited piece-work pay systems is
historic, and production limitations are common even in unorganized
plants. 3 Unions fear that such systems would encourage employees
to increase production, resulting in a lowering of piece-work rates,
so that at the new, higher level of output, employees would earn
little more than they did before. Alternatively, greater production
could lead to an increase in the production minimum so that the
piece-work rate would apply to fewer producible products. Furthermore, there is a fear that the competitive pressure generated will
endanger workers' health, create or intensify jealousies, and, perhaps,
reduce the work force. Excessive productivity-pay differentials which
arise in the absence of ceilings may cause rivalry and bad feelings
221 394
222 See

U.S. at 433.
Cox, The Role of Laws in Preserving Union Democracy, 72

609, 612 (1958).
223 See generally S.

HARV. L. REV.

SLICHTER, J. HEALY, & E. LIVERNASH, THE IMPACT OF COLLECTIVE BARGAINING ON MANAGEMENT (1960).
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among workers-particularly in the ranks of older employees unable
224
to work at a pace comparable to young men.
Thus, as in Allis-Chalmers, the production-ceiling rule is an
internal protective device. Note that the operation of the ceiling
rule is far less severe than the no strikebreaking rule in AllisChalmers. The production limitation does no more than to hold
workers to a pay maximum who would otherwise outdistance others
on the payroll because of their exceptional working speed and endurance. The rule merely forbids union members to take advantage
of benefits the employer is willing to confer. In Allis-Chalmers,
however, the union's rule barred any wages during a strike, even
though the employer might fill their positions with replacements.
As in Allis-Chalmers, the union's rule restricted the employees' work
output and earnings. The Court, however, assumed that the rule
merely deferred earnings. The rule was seen as not retarding the
flow of production but, rather, merely limiting the amount of
current earnings which members may receive. In accordance with
shop practice, members are required to "bank" their earnings in
excess of the ceiling and hold them in reserve for occasions when
they earn less than the ceiling, instead of reporting excess production
to the company for immediate compensation. Without more facts,
however, the Court's view of the rule's operation is mere conjecture.
For instance, how much of this over-production is wasted, i.e., not
consumed by annual inventory time? If it is all consumed, then the
union's rule probably has little effect on production and employees
are probably not adversely affected. Moreover, although no company
discipline is meted out to complying employees, it would be relevant
to ask if other employment opportunities are affected. Does compliance, for instance, affect an employee's chances for promotion?
The Court admits that the rule has and was intended to have
an impact beyond the confines of the union organization. The same
was true of Allis-Chalmers. But the Court states the enforcement of
the rule does not violate Section 8(b) (1) (A) unless some impairment of statutory labor policy can be shown. The plaintiffs, however,
argued that the impairment of statutory labor policy was the violation of the Section 7 right not to take part in union activities. The
Court, as in Allis-Chalmers, attaches little weight to these interests
despite the Congressional recognition of these concerns in Section 7.
The Court, rather, stresses union institutional concerns and managerial interests. Thus, the Court discusses seriously the petitioner's
contention that the rule impedes collective bargaining, and is, therefore, a violation of statutory policy. Although the NLRA seeks to
224

See Brief for U.A.W. at 12, Schofield v. NLRB, 394 U.S. 423 (1969).
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promote collective bargaining, the particular provision of the act
involved here is directed to individual rights.
The Court finds the production ceiling is a bargainable issue;
indeed, the employer never refused to bargain about it, and the
union has at various times agreed to raise the ceiling in return for
an increase in the piece rate. The ceiling has also been regularly
used to compute the new piece rate. Shop practice and bargaining
history suggest that the ceiling is part of the agreement.22 5
Furthermore, it is clear that the company participated in the
actual operation of the union's production limitation. The company
honored an employee's choice by permitting him to "bank" excess
production for latter payment (provided that all banks be depleted
by annual inventory time), and paid employees for this production
during subsequent non-productive periods. The company respected
the system by supplying the union with the employees' work cards
to permit checking for individual compliance with the union system. 226 The company used the ceiling rates as a point of reference

in computing new piece rates after an increase in the hourly machine
rate has been negotiated. Furthermore, when a piece-work job was
retimed, the affected employees were guaranteed a minimum rate
equal to their previous average earned rate for that job. The average
rate for most employees closely approximated the ceiling rate, and
it-rather than the machine rate-may actually have been the de
facto basic wage rate. In light of these and other factors the Board
reasonably concluded that the company has accepted the ceilings
as an integral part of its modus operandi.
As in Allis-Chalmers, the Court's opinion suggests that state
courts should enforce these fines. The union constitution established
225 The company has frequently proposed the elimination of the union's rule, but

then compromised on an increase in the ceiling. Thus the 1953 contract provided that
the previous agreement be modified to "Increase the ceiling on all piece work jobs a
total of $13 per hour effective July 1, 1953, over the ceilings of piece work jobs in
effect on April 30, 1953." Similarly, the strike settlement agreement on August 14,
1956, provided that "The ceiling [sic] on earnings is to be raised ten cents ($.10) of
five-one-fifty-six or a total of twenty-three cents ($.23) per hour." To achieve this
raise in the ceiling, the company agreed to satisfy certain grievances and to increase
vacation benefits. Again, in the course of the 1959 negotiations, the company requested
that the ceilings be increased ten cents ($.10) per hour. See Brief for Respondent at 7,
id. As part of the 1962 settlement, the union agreed to raise production ceilings three
cents ($.03). See Brief for U.A.W. app. B, id.
226 For the system's advantages to management, see Local 283, UAW 145
N.L.R.B. 1097, 1119-20 (1964). Although company witnesses complain that the banking system resulted in periods of voluntary worker idleness, especially before vacation
period or annual inventory time, the witnesses on cross-examination conceded that the
company had recently promulgated orders which curbed unnecessary idleness and
these rules were effective in resolving the problem.
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penalties, including suspension and fines from one dollar to one
hundred dollars; expulsion may follow non-payment of fines.22 7 This
section says nothing, however, about enforcement of fines. Common
law courts might well restrict this provision to make non-payment of
fines punishable only by expulsion. In this light, the discussion of the
contract approach in Allis-Chalmers perhaps provides another
weapon to the power of a union to seek conformity with union
policies.
There is some doubt that state courts before Scofield would
acknowledge the substantive validity of production ceilings. 28 Although courts have recognized discipline for strikebreaking, fines
for exceeding production limitations have not received judicial
favor:
[i]f a voluntary trade organization should ordain that a member who
in the pursuit of his occupation exceeds the average level of industry
and production of his fellow-workers, shall be expelled for conduct
unbecoming a member, I would experience no hesitation in invalidating
such a regulation as positively repugnant and inimical to our traditional public policy. The freedom of an individual to excel in any
field of lawful activity is one of our national ideals and a substantial
right which the individual may not himself barter away.2 29

Thus, again, the Court may have altered state law while purporting to rely upon it. One aspect of state law, however, is interesting here. As mentioned above, state courts gave strikebreakers little
more protection than wildcat strikers.23 0 Although courts avoided
the merits of a strike, courts "did limit the union's power to those
strikes which are properly called and which are legal. If the strike
violates the union constitution, or if it is illegal and has been enjoined, the members cannot be punished for refusing to cooperate." 23 '
This is perhaps a parallel to the Supreme Court's condition that rules
be properly adopted, and, more importantly, suggests the properly
227

Brief of Respondent at 3-8, Scofield v. NLRB, 394 U.S. 423 (1969).

See Summers, Legal Limitations on Union Discipline, 64 H~Av. L. REv. 1049,
1065 (1951). Courts have, however, upheld discipline for a variety of offenses which
undercut the union's economic strength. See Rubens v. Weber, 237 App. Div. 15, 260
N.Y.S. 701 (1932) (working for less than union scale) ; Havens v. King, 221 App. Div.
475,224 N.Y.S. 193 (1927) (working during a strike) ; Watson v. Victory, 127 N.Y.L.J.
307 (Sup. Ct. 1952) (working for a non-union employer).
229 Dragwa v. Federal Labor Union No. 23070, 136 N.J. Eq. 172, 176, 41 A.2d 32,
34 (Ch. 1945).
230 Summers, Legal Limitations on Union Discipline, 64 HARv. L. REv. 1049, 1066
(1951). Although courts avoided the merits of a strike, courts ".... did limit the union's
power to those strikes which are properly called and which are legal. If the strike
violated the union constitution or if it is illegal and has been enjoined, the members
cannot be punished for refusing to cooperate."
231 Id. at 1066-67 nn.87-89.
228
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analytical framework for resolving the clash of interests arising in
cases under Section 8(b) (1) (A).
VII.

UNION DISCIPLINARY POWER UNDER THE
ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK

NLRA:

AN

Marine Workers demonstrates that, despite the broad language
in Allis-Chalmers, union disciplinary action will be invalid when it
violates statutory policy. A particular policy, however, may be only
one of the interests involved in a particular case, as various statutory
policies may conflict. The fines for strikebreaking in Allis-Chalmers
were upheld although the Court admits that strikebreaking fell
within the ambit of Section 7. Moreover, Section 8(b)(1)(A)
reaches some forms of union retaliation against strikebreaking, e.g.,
the use of force or violence. Surely these fairly explicit protections
in the Act should not receive less respect than implicit policies, such
as the protection of access to the NLRB. The fines were upheld, and
individual interests denied protection, because the Court felt that
the fines were a necessary incident to the union's Congressionallydelegated role as collective bargaining agent. Thus the fines were
consistent with federal policy and overbalanced rights of disobedience seemingly encompassed by Section 7. The relevance of public
policy, then, is acknowledged rather than rejected by Allis-Chalmers.
The question which will no doubt bedevil the NLRB will involve the application of the above formulation to concrete cases.
The NLRB cannot invalidate disciplinary penalties simply because
it disapproves of them. The excessive governmental intrusion into
internal union affairs would be inconsistent with, first, the desire
to encourage private decision-making and union democracy and,
second, the awareness that unions serve as autonomous power
centers in the society whose independence is critical for democratic
government.
The initial step in the formulation of a workable approach is
a return to the Court's rejected analogy to Section 8(a)(1). The
NLRB and the courts have defined the scope of "protected activity"
under Sections 7 and 8(a) (1), giving generous scope to the Congressional policy of protecting concerted activity from employer
interference. Activity like strikebreaking is directly contrary to
group goals and, in a real sense, inconsistent with a policy of encouraging and protecting concerted activity. Yet, the right to refuse
to participate is granted in the same provision of the Act which
protects concerted activity, and must, therefore, receive equal
respect.
The clash of interests in Allis-Chalmers is a direct result of
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this inconsistency within Section 7. The resolution in that case
turned on the Court's reading of federal labor policy. This suggests
a rough guideline-union discipline aimed at implementing underlying federal policy, or the exercise of union power to protect the
union's federally assigned role, will be protected. On the other hand,
where discipline deters protected activity without the presence of
compensating union interests, such as fines for decertification attempts, it will not be upheld. Similarly, union conduct which itself
is inconsistent with federal labor policy cannot lead to justifiable
discipline. Thus, a union may not discipline members for violating
union rules when those rules compel the commission of a crime or
an unfair labor practice. Such an approach merely applies to the
scope of union disciplinary power the same considerations which
define protected concerted activity.232
An analogy to the scope of protected conduct suggests that
employees who violate a union by-law in order to avoid a violation
of the Act or statutory policy may not be punished for such action.
Thus, in a situation similar to that in Scofield, no discipline should
be permitted if the union's ceiling itself is inconsistent with the
collective agreement. The NLRB may be moving in this direction,
for it recently held that a union may not fine employees who cross
picket lines when the strike is in breach of a no-strike clause.233
The fine constituted a penalty for the strikebreaker's refusal to
"violate" the collective agreement. The result parallels the approach
taken under Section 8 (a) (1) as a violation of a collective agreement
is not a protected activity, and strikers lose the normal protection
of Section 7.124 Since the union's actions are not protected by Section 7, the balance of interests in Allis-Chalmers leads to a
different result. The union's interest in solidarity and strength remains the same, but here the union's action infringes an important
policy of the Act. The case suggests, then, that strikebreaking may
lead to discipline only when the strike itself offends no policy of
the Act. This approach is hardly novel. In NLRB v. Bricklayers
232 See Southern S.S. Co. v. NLRB, 316 U.S. 31 (1942) (strike violated mutiny
provisions of U.S. Criminal Code); Hoover Co. v. NLRB, 191 F.2d 380 (6th Cir. 1956)
(strike to compel employer to violate the NLRA); American News Co., 55 N.L.R.B.
1302 (1944) (strike to compel employer to violate Wage Stabilization Act).
In addition to the requirement that concerted activities have a lawful objective, it
is essential that they be carried out in a lawful manner. See NLRB v. Fansteel Metallurgical Corp., 306 U.S. 240 (1939); NLRB, TwENTY-TnIRD ANNUAL REPORT 64
(1958). See generally Cox, The Right to Engage in Concerted Activities, 26 IND. L.J.
319 (1951) ; Getman, The Protection of Economic Pressure by Section 7 oj the NLRA,
115 U. PA. L. REV. 1195 (1967) ; Lipton, Misconduct in Concerted Activities Under the
NLRA, 8 LAB. L.J. 299 (1957); Note, Strike Misconduct as Grounds for Denial of
Reinstatement, 32 N.Y.U.L. REv. 839 (1957).
283 Local 12419 UMW, 176 N.L.R.B. No. 89 (1969).
284 See NLRB v. Sands Mfg., 306 U.S. 332 (1939).
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and Masons Local 2,235 members were fined for refusing to cross a
picket line.The Board found that observance of the picket line would
constitute a secondary boycott and, as part of the remedy for the
Section 8(b) (4) (B) violation, ordered the union to refund the fines
6
paid.

23

The variety of possible cases boggles the mind and difficult
problems of accommodation will arise. The attempt to distinguish
"internal union affairs" from internal rules which radiate beyond
the union may well fail in the end, aground on the shoals of impossibility. For instance, unions such as the musicians typically discipline members for working with non-members. The union's interest
in resisting the presence of non-union workers who may undercut
union standards and threaten the union's base of support has been
traditionally recognized, and the NLRB has upheld such discipline.237
The effect of this rule, however, is to induce the employer to discriminate in favor of union members. Section 8(b) (2) will not be
violated, however, unless the union makes a direct approach to the
employer for the purpose of causing him to discriminate by accommodating his hiring practices to the union's by-law.3 8 In many cases,
however, no affirmative approach to the employer will be required,
and the internal enforcement of the union's by-law will produce the
same results.23 9 Should the employer be approached, or should the
NLRB reverse this latter rule to accord with the realities of the
situation, the union's discipline then becomes suspect although union
interests have not been lessened.
One problem with making the nature of the union's conduct a
critical factor in determining the propriety of discipline under Section 8(b) (1) (A) is that the approach is essentially retrospective.
The validity of union discipline would turn, at least in part, upon
a legal determination of the protected nature of the union's conduct
to be made at a later time. To the employee, however, the critical
time is when he must decide whether to disobey union dictates.
Placing the risk of proper interpretation of the NLRA upon him
235 166 N.L.R.B. No. 26 (1967).

236 See also NLRB v. Local 751, Carpenters, 285 F.2d 633 (9th Cir. 1960).
237 See NLRB v. Musicians Local 802, 176 N.L.R.B. 46 (1969).
238 See Glasser v. NLRB, 395 F.2d 401 (2d Cir. 1968).
289 The NLRB has invalidated discipline aimed at a supervisor-member who electioneered against the union and hired non-union employees. The NLRB held that the
discipline violated the company's right under § 8(b) (1) (B) to select its representative
for collective bargaining. Although it is arguable whether the fine really interferes with
the employer's freedom, the NLRB also considered the discipline a direct attempt to get
the supervisor, as the employer's representative, to violate the act, by discriminating

against non-union employees. New Mexico Carpenters' Council, 176 N.L.R.B. No. 105
(1969).
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may seem unfair. He cannot be expected to be as knowledgeable
as union officials on these matters, and the risk of error might induce
him to forego the exercise of a statutory right protecting disobedience.
There are, however, strong responses to these arguments. First,
there may be no reason to protect individual acts of disobedience
when the employee has made an erroneous analysis of either the
facts or the applicable law. Surely the Court's stress on the necessity
for the effective prosecution of group goals suggests a lack of great
concern over individual decision making. Indeed, the court in AllisChalmers did not even consider the substantial economic interests
of the strikebreakers, despite their explicit protection in Section 7
of the Act. The union itself often acts at its peril, for instance, when
it determines whether the employer has committed an unfair labor
practice during the term of a collective bargaining agreement. A
strike in response to such an unfair labor practice will lead to a
characterization of the strike as protected; an error, however, may
subject the union to damages for breach of a no-strike clause under
NLRA Section 301.240

Finally, it is true that the risk of an improper assessment might
discourage the resort to protected activity. The Court, however,
seems hardly disposed to give weight to this common dilemma. Thus,
in Allis-Chalmers the Court seemed unconcerned that the threat of
court enforced fines might effectively restrain completely the exercise
of the right to cross picket lines. Surely Justice Black was correct
in noting that the possibility that the Board might find the fine to
violate the NLRA, or that a state court might refuse to enforce the
fine, will hardly induce employees to take action they feel is proper.
Given the vague and uncertain contours of union discipline power
under Section 8(b) (1) (A), this additional risk may not add significantly to the burden already placed on the employee. The very
pronouncements of the Court make it less likely that individual acts
240 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1964). A typical no-strike clause will not be read to bar
strikes in response to employer unfair labor practices. Mastro Plastics Corp. v. NLRB,
350 U.S. 270 (1956). Thus, in a case involving a strike during the term of an agreement containing such a clause, the protected nature of the strike will turn on whether
the strike was provoked by an employer unfair labor practice.
Unfair labor practice strikers, unlike economic strikers, cannot be permanently
replaced and the employer is obligated to reinstate strikers upon request. See, e.g.,
Mastro Plastics Corp. v. NLRB, id.; NLRB v. Beles Colman Lumber Co., 96 F.2d 196
(9th Cir. 1938). An unfair labor practice strike does not lose its character despite the
fact that economic reasons may have contributed to or even precipitated the work
stoppage. Brown Radio Service, 70 N.L.R.B. 476 (1946). If an unfair labor practice
occurring during an economic strike prolongs the strike, the strike is converted to an
unfair labor practice strike. See Harcourt & Co., 98 N.L.R.B. 892 (1952).
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of disobedience will occur, and the additional risk of an erroneous
interpretation of law provides only one of many factors making such
acts of disobedience ultra-hazardous.
Two alternative approaches could be considered, but both
suffer by comparison with the position taken above. First, Section
8 (b) (1) (A) could be read to protect employees from the imposition
of union discipline when the employees acted upon a good faith
belief that the union's action was unprotected. Under the previouslymentioned approach, the employee would be protected when the
union's conduct is indeed unprotected, irrespective of the employee's
state of mind. This alternative, then, would protect an employee who
incorrectly viewed the situation where, in fact, the union's conduct
was protected. This approach, although it does provide a greater
measure of protection to individual interests, weakens union institutional interests in cases where federal policy affirmatively promotes
concerted activity. Thus, the approach seems inconsistent with the
emphasis in Allis-Chalmers and Scofield on the legitimacy of the
union's goals. There is no suggestion in Allis-Chalmers, for instance,
that the fines would have been improper if the strikebreakers had
honestly believed the strike was illegal. Moreover, the approach
would create administrative difficulties because of its reliance on the
employee's state of mind. It is doubtful that union trial tribunals are
capable, even if willing, to make the fine distinctions required, nor
is it clear that such a task is justified in light of the lack of knowledge
concerning the occurrence of such acts of disobedience. A good faith
belief does not usually protect employees from discharge when they
strike in violation of a no-strike clause, and the substantial interests
in union effectiveness suggest that employees should receive no
greater protection from union retaliation.
Alternatively, Section 8 (b) (1) (A) could be interpreted to protect union discipline irrespective of the protected nature of the
union's conduct. Such an approach, however, may give greater
deferrence than necessary to the union's role as collective bargaining
agent and interpreter of group goals. It is true that the union can
be expected to generally avoid conduct which could subject itself
to institutional penalties, but individual employees may lose their
jobs if they participate in unprotected conduct. The employee deserves the ability to protect his own interests when he correctly
recognizes that the actions of his union transgress the collective
agreement or the NLRA. As noted above, the common law considered the legality of concerted activity when evaluating the propriety
of union discipline for refusing to participate in such conduct. Since
the justification for the imposition of discipline under Allis-Chalmers
and Scofield is the legitimacy of the union's interests, discipline
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should not be permitted when that interest cannot be justified under
federal labor policy. After all, the evaluation is not made on a clear
slate-Section 7 gives employees the right to refrain from participation in union activities. Some recognition of this interest is required,
although there is a need to weigh the union's institutional interests
as well. Thus, it is submitted that union discipline be evaluated in
light of the "protected" nature of its conduct, and despite the good
faith beliefs of the disciplined employee.
Again, the suggested approach merely parallels the approach
taken under Section 8(a) (1). Employees who engage in wildcat
strikes in derogation of the union's status are not protected from
employer discrimination despite their good faith belief in the legality
of their conduct. Union discipline for the same conduct seems justifiable. Indeed, taking the Court's approach in Allis-Chalmers, union
discipline for wildcat strikes is far less serious to employees than
the employer's right to permanently replace the same strikers. The
same analysis should be applied to employees who refuse to participate in authorized union activity which is in fact unprotected.
Employees should be permitted to disobey union commands and
protect their jobs, however, when union conduct violates the collective
agreement or Section 8(b) of the NLRA. Since the Act either prohibits or does not protect such conduct, the protection of union
discipline for disobedience would be inconsistent with the policies
of the Act.
The resolution of these problems in a case by case manner
will hardly advise employees of the extent of their freedom or
assist unions who wish to abide by legal restraints. Predictability
might be aided to some degree by the use of experience under other
provisions of the Act. The experience and knowledge stored in the
interpretation of Section 8(a) (1) and in the attempts to define the
scope of protected activity are, as this article has attempted to
demonstrate, relevant to the solution of problems under Section
8(b)(1) (A). Nothing is gained by balkanizing the Act and its
history into tiny compartments and, indeed, much is lost.

